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JURISDICTION
The authority believed to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah to hear this appeal from the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County is Article VIII,
Section 4 of the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann., Section 78-22(3) (j) (1988); and Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The Supreme Court, acting pursuant to Rule 42, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, transferred this appeal to this Court by order
dated April 3, 1992.

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

A.

The following issues were presented for review in this

case by the appellant:
1.
the motion

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in denying
of

appellant, Master

Protection

Corporation, dba

Firemaster (hereinafter "Firemaster") to continue the trial.
Firemaster claims this issue is a mixed question of fact
and law.

The nature and extent of the facts supporting and

opposing motion for a continuance of the trial date are reviewable
under a clearly erroneous standard. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); State v.
Humphreys, 707 P.2d 109 (Utah 1985).

Whether the Trial Court

abused its discretion in refusing to continue the trial date is a
question of law reviewed for correctness. Griffiths v. Hammon. 560
P.2d 1375, 1376 (Utah 1977).
2.

Did the Trial Court err in refusing to grant

Firemaster a new trial where the jury issued verdicts that were
inconsistent between Firemaster and Mr. Holbrook?

This issue is

a question of law reviewed for correctness. Marchant v. Park

City,

111 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989).
3.

Was

substantial

evidence

presented

at

trial

respecting the nature or extent of, or responsibility for, damages
to Mr. Holbrook beyond those for unpaid sales commissions to
constitute an abuse of discretion by the Trial Court in refusing
to grant Firemaster's motion for a remittitur of the jury's award
of $50,000 on Mr. Holbrook's claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
This issue is a mixed question of fact and law.
2

The

factual composition of the disputed damages is reviewable under a
clearly erroneous standard. Utah R.Civ. P.52(a); Matter of Estate
of Bartell,

776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989).

The propriety of the

Trial Court's refusal to compel a remittitur of the disputed
damages is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Marchant,
supra at 677.
4.

Did the Trial Court err in refusing to award

attorneys' fees to Firemaster as the "prevailing party" on the
parties' respective breach of contract claims?

This is a question

of law reviewed for correctness. Marchant, supra 771 P.2d at 677.
5. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to enter judgment
against Mr. Holbrook for any portion of three promissory notes that
he signed to purchase his franchises?
This issue is a mixed question of fact and law.

The

extent to which Mr. Holbrook is indebted to Firemaster under the
notes is a factual issue reviewable under a clearly erroneous
standard.

Matter of Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d at 886. Whether

Mr. Holbrook is excused from performing his obligations under the
notes is a question of law reviewed for correctness.

Marchant,

supra 771 P. 2d at 677.
6.

Did the Trial Court err in overruling Firemaster's

objection to the statement of Mr. Holbrook's counsel in closing
argument that he was "... just certain that none of you (jurors)
would choose to be placed in that kind of a circumstance (of being
forced to enter into promissory notes), and were you, that you
would feel as though you had been forced into the decision to go
into debt?"

This is a question of law reviewed for correctness.

Marchant, supra 771 P.2d at 677.
7.

Did the Trial Court err in deciding to terminate a
3

Holbrook, an injunction that enjoined Mr. Holbrook from using any
confidential customer information.
reviewed for correctness.

B.

This is a question of law

Marchant, supra 771 P.2d at 677.

Statement of issues presented by the cross-appeal of Mr.

Holbrook:
1. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to grant the
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment requesting that
Firemaster should be ordered to perform and pay for a fair and
impartial accounting under the contracts?
law to be reviewed for correctness.
2.

This is a question of

Marchant, supra, at 677.

Did the Trial Court err in granting Firemaster's

Motion to Dismiss the State and Federal Racketeering claims by Mr.
Holbrook?

This is a question of law reviewed for correctness as

a result of the Trial Court's decision to grant Firemaster's Rule
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. Marchant, supra, at 677.
3.

Did the Trial Court err in refusing to permit Mr.

Holbrook to put on evidence at trial of lost profits incurred as
a result of the imposition of the preliminary injunction and/or
alternatively to permit such a determination as part of Mr.
Holbrook's post-trial Motion for Declaratory Relief?
This is a question of law reviewed for correctness.
Marchant, supra, at 677.
4.

Was the award of only $5,872.36 in punitive damages

error where the District Court refused to permit evidence of
Firemaster's net worth to go to the jury?
This is a question of law reviewed for correctness.
Marchant, supra, at 677.
4

5.

Did

the Trial

court

err

in nor

granting rar.

Holbrook's Motion for Directed Verdict, Motion for Judgment NOV,
and Motion for Declaratory Relief, striking the jury verdict to
Firemaster regarding the breaches of the confidentiality provisions
of the contracts?

The result of a determination in Mr. Holbrook's

favor would be a finding of a wrongful injunction and that Mr.
Holbrook was the prevailing party for assessing and awarding costs
and attorneys' fees.
This is a mixed question of law and fact.

The factual

composition of the question is reviewable under a clearly erroneous
standard.

See Matter of Estate of Bartell, supra. The question of

law is Marchant, supra, at 677.
6.

Did the Trial Court err in refusing to award Mr.

Holbrook his attorneys' fees and costs as the prevailing party in
the action under the contracts, based upon the

"net winner"

concept, or by law.
This is a mixed question of law and fact.

The factual

composition of the issue is reviewable under a clearly erroneous
standard.

Matter

of

Estate

of

Bartell, supra.

The

legal

composition of the question is to be reviewed for correctness.
Marchant, supra.
7. Did the District Court err in requiring Mr. Holbrook
to pay the sum of $11,014.00 in cash as an "equitable" payment to
Firemaster for access to the confidential customer list after Mr.
Holbrook was found to have fully performed his obligations under
the contracts until he terminated because of the breaches of
Firemaster over the two and one-half year period prior to his
termination?
This is a mixed question of law and fact.
5

The factual

^
standard.

Matter

-~ ^wvX^WUJJIC unuci. a uieany erroneous
of

Estate

of

Bartell, supra.

The

legal

composition of the question is to be reviewed for correctness.
Marchant, supra, at 677.

III.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES OR RULES

There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances
or

rules

whose

interpretation

is

believed

to

be

solely

determinative of the outcome of this case.

IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
NATURE OF CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN
DISTRICT COURT.

Bard Holbrook, the Plaintiff in this case, instituted
this action to recover funds from sales, services, and from
overcharges for parts purchases for which he had either not been
paid, or for which he had been overcharged pursuant to accounting
decisions by Firemaster and for reimbursement for services paid for
by him but never rendered in whole or in part by Firemaster under
a series of territory and franchise agreements (collectively, the
"Franchise

Agreements")

with

Master

Protection

Corporation,

(hereinafter referred to as "Firemaster").
Mr.

Holbrook

claimed
6

that

the

underpayments

and

overcharges relating to the sums owed him by Firemaster not only
constituted breaches of the various agreements but were done in an
intentional, consistent pattern which constituted

among other

claims conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, racketeering, fraud,
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
contracts and justified the imposition of punitive damages.
All of the claims of Mr. Holbrook in this action are as
a result of Firemaster's actions during the time period of June,
1987 through January of 1990 when Mr. Holbrook was working under
the agreements between the parties. In January of 1990, after Mr.
Holbrook had terminated his relationship with Firemaster he started
his own company in the fire suppression industry in competition
with Firemaster.
Firemaster counter-claimed in the lawsuit for alleged
breaches of the franchise agreements for actions of Mr. Holbrook
after his termination of the agreements in January of 1990.
Firemaster introduced absolutely no evidence at Trial to show any
breaches of the agreements by Mr. Holbrook prior to his termination
of the agreements in January 1990. In fact, Firemaster stipulated
it would introduce no such evidence (Tr. at R. 5244-45).

The

special jury verdicts returned by the jury found Mr. Holbrook to
have honored all three agreements and Firemaster to have breached
all three agreements.(R. 2729-37, 2759-60).
Shortly after entering the lawsuit, Firemaster requested
a preliminary injunction restraining Mr. Holbrook from servicing
certain accounts during the pendency of the action which he had
serviced while associated with Firemaster.

The District Court

imposed such preliminary injunction and required a bond only
$75,000, well below the $500,000 bond requested by Mr. Holbrook.
7

Mr. Holbrook made a motion to the Trial Court for a
partial summary judgment for an accounting on the grounds that
Firemaster had been assigned all sales by Mr. Holbrook under the
contracts and by contract was paid to perform bookkeeping and
accounting for Mr. Holbrook regarding such accounts receivable.
The Court denied this motion.
Firemaster made several motions to dismiss various claims
brought by Mr. Holbrook.

One motion

sought to dismiss Mr.

Holbrook's claims against Firemaster under the Utah State and
Federal Racketeering Statutes.

The Court granted such motion on

the basis that the choice of law provisions in the contracts
dictated that California law applied. (R. 1671-74) and not Utah or
Federal law.
At trial, the jury issued a series of special verdicts,
which among other things awarded Mr. Holbrook compensatory damages
of $85,935.06 .1

In doing so, the jury specifically determined Mr.

Holbrook had fulfilled all his obligations under the contracts and
that Firemaster, by its actions, was prohibited from enforcing the
contracts against Mr. Holbrook. (R. 2729-37, 2759-60).
As a consequence of the jury being presented with a
lengthy number of special verdicts (R. 2719-62), the jury made an
apparently contradictory ruling by awarding Firemaster $10,000 in
damages on one of its counter-claims for alleged breaches of the
confidentiality provisions of agreements (including a trade secret
agreement) which the jury found to be still in effect in some
manner after Mr. Holbrook's termination with Firemaster in January
of 1990. (R. 2726-28) .

The jury also awarded Mr. Holbrook $5,872.36 in punitive
damages against Firemaster on his conversion cause of action.
8

In entering final judgments in the case based upon the
jury's verdicts,

(R. 3882-91), the Trial

Court rejected Mr.

Holbrook's claim that Utah law as found by this Court in the cases
of Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1990) and,
Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1988) clearly mandates
that because:
1) Mr. Holbrook was found to have honored his obligations
under the contracts between June of 1987 and January of 1990; and
2) only

thereafter

acted

in

contravention

of

such

contracts; and
3) that to the contrary Firemaster repeatedly breached
all the contracts from June of 1987 through January of 1990;
4) that the Trial Court should have applied the law to
this case and declared that all Mr. Holbrook's obligations under
all the agreements were terminated and as a matter of law stricken
the $10,000 award to Firemaster under its claim for breach of the
confidentiality provisions of the contracts.
Both sides submitted multiple post-trial motions to the
Trial Court.

The failure of the Trial Court to clarify the

respective legal positions of the parties' rights and obligations
under the contracts and thereafter, based upon the clear chronology
of the case, denied Mr. Holbrook being found by the Trial Court to
be the prevailing party in the action for purposes of recovering
his costs and attorneys' fees.
At Trial, the Court had granted portions of Firemaster's
motion in limine by refusing to permit Mr. Holbrook to submit
evidence of damages he sustained as a result of the imposition of
the injunction to the jury on the basis that he had not properly
pled the issue of special damages under Rule 9(g), Utah Rules of
9

Holbrook damages for the imposition of the injunction as requested
by him in his post-trial Motion for Declaratory Relief.
The Trial Court, by granting Firemaster's objection to
such evidence at trial, refused to permit the submission of the
Firemaster financial statement to the jury, notwithstanding the
jury being permitted to consider the issue of the appropriate
amount of punitive damages which was submitted by way of a special
verdict form. (R. 2743-45).

The jury assessed punitive damages

against Firemaster as a result of the conversion of his funds by
Firemaster.

The correct amount of punitive damages could not

possibly have been assessed as a result of the jury having no
financial information pertaining to Firemaster.

An award of

punitive damages without financial information pertaining to the
Defendant's net worth is clearly a violation of Utah law.

See

Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah
1991) .
In the process of arguing Firemaster's post-trial motion to
impose

liability

on

Mr.

Holbrook

for

the

promissory

notes

associated with the franchise purchase, the Trial Court arrived at
the

result,

sua

sponte, of

awarding

Firemaster

the

sum of

$11,014.00 as an "equitable" payment by Mr. Holbrook for access to
customer information.
Final judgment was entered on Mr. Holbrook's complaint
and Firemaster's counterclaims on October 3, 1991 (R. 3882-91).
The Trial Court thereafter

denied Mr. Holbrook's Motion for

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Firemaster's Motions for
Remittitur, New Trial and for Judgment NOV by Order dated January
3, 1992 (R. 4253-54).

Firemaster filed its notice of appeal on
10

January 27, 1992 (R. 4255).

Mr. Holbrook filed his notice of

cross-appeal on February 4, 1992 (R. 4262).

B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Bard N. Holbrook, the Plaintiff, Respondent and Cross-

Appellee

herein, had

been

engaged

in

the

business

of

fire

prevention and suppression services in the State of Utah and
surrounding areas for approximately

seventeen years when this

matter was instituted in January of 1990.

(Tr. at R. 4342-43).

For the two and one-half year period prior to January of
199 0, Mr. Holbrook had been affiliated with a company known as
Firemaster, in the capacity of an independent contractor and
franchisee.
During this time period of

1987-1990, Mr. Holbrook

provided goods and services in large part to those customers he had
been servicing for many years prior to his association with
Firemaster. (Tr. at R. 4374-75).
Firemaster

is

a

Delaware

corporation,

having

it's

principle place of business in Los Angeles, California. Firemaster
is the largest company of its kind in the country the fire
suppression industry.
Firemaster did not operate any business in the State of
Utah prior to approximately June of 19 87.

In June of 1987,

Firemaster bought Intermountain Fire, a fire protection company
situated in Salt Lake City.

Intermountain Fire was a company that

provided fire suppression sales and services throughout the State
of

Utah.

Mr.

Robin

Phillips

was

the

principal

owner

of

Intermountain Fire and stayed on with Firemaster after the purchase
of

Intermountain

Fire as the Firemaster
11
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Fire

prior to its purchase by Firemaster.
At the time in approximately June of 19 87 that Firemaster
purchased Intermountain Fire, it terminated the service technicians
such as Mr. Holbrook and informed them that they could come to work
for Firemaster solely as independent contractors. (Tr. at R. 434950, 5061-64). Mr. Holbrook then executed an independent contractor
agreement with Firemaster. See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 1. (Tr.
at R. 4349-50, 4376-78).
In April of 1988, Mr. Holbrook was advised if he did not
purchase franchises in the area in which he was servicing customers
as an independent contractor that such territories would be sold
to someone else and he would be terminated.

Faced with losing the

territories he had been servicing for years and the prospect of
the enforcement against him of the non-competition clauses of the
contracts, he entered

into Purchase Agreements

regarding two

franchise areas as set forth in the franchise purchase documents,
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 2 and 3. (Tr. at R. 4386-4404)
Mr. Holbrook continued to operate in the independent
contractor and franchise areas until January of 1990, when he
notified

Firemaster

that

he believed

he

had

been

underpaid

commissions,that he had been overcharged relating to sales and
services performed by him under the applicable agreements and that
he had not been provided services for which he had paid Firemaster
substantial

sums

of money.

Mr. Holbrook

made

demand

upon

Firemaster to resolve the problems, but after it refused to do so
he terminated his relationship and instituted this litigation. (R.
3-182)
At the time Mr. Holbrook instituted this litigation he
12

formed a new company called Fire Suppression Services, Inc. and
began performing similar services in the same territories as he had
performed for the prior 17 years, including those years when he was
associated with Firemaster.

Firemaster promptly counter-claimed

against Mr. Holbrook alleging that he owed various sums under the
franchise agreements, including promissory notes for the purchase
of the franchise areas and additionally made claims for breaches
of the franchise agreements.(R. 225-545).
At Trial, as set forth in the special verdict forms (R.
2729-37, 2759-60), the jury found that Mr. Holbrook had fully
performed his obligations under each of the contracts between the
parties. Additionally the special jury verdicts reflected findings
in favor of Mr. Holbrook for Firemaster's breach of fiduciary duty,
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
conversion, and punitive damages associated with such conversion.
(R. 2719-62)
The

jury awarded damages to Firemaster

against Mr.

Holbrook for breach of the confidentiality provisions of the
contracts (on one or all of the agreements set forth on the special
verdict, R. 2726-28) and for sums relating to parts that Firemaster
alleged had not been paid for or returned at the time of Mr.
Holbrook's termination.

Mr. Arthur Miller, Mr. Holbrook's expert

accountant, included such sums referenced in the conversion claim
in his report, (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 32) but the jury chose
to ignore such evidence.

That award is not the subject of any

appeal.
Of particular importance in this case are the factual
findings by the jury on the first three special verdict forms
relating to each of the three agreements of the parties, which all
13

Question No. 2: Do you find that the Plaintiff Bard Holbrook fully
performed

his obligations under the territory

agreement

[and

franchise agreement] prior to it's termination?
Answer: Yes, or No.
Answer: Yes.
Question No. 3:

Do you find the Plaintiff Bard Holbrook was

lawfully excused from performing any further obligations under the
territory agreement?
Answer Yes, or No.
Answer: Yes.
Question No. 4:

Do you find the Defendant Firemaster wrongfully

and without excuse or justification failed to pay Plaintiff Bard
Holbrook the commissions and provide services set forth in Section
4 and 8 of the territory agreement?
Answer: Yes, or No.
Answer: Yes. (R. 2729-2737)
It is crucial to focus on the time period covered by the
agreements and the answers of the jury set forth above, i.e. June
of

1987 through

the

end of Mr. Holbrook's

Firemaster in January of 1990.

association with

The jury award to Firemaster of

$10,000 for Mr. Holbrook's alleged breaches of the confidentially
provisions of the contracts occurred only after

Mr. Holbrook's

termination of his association with Firemaster.
The chronologies in this case must be followed clearly
in order to understand both the validity of Mr. Holbrook's appeals
and the invalidity of Firemaster's appeals. Both parties reserved
certain issues to be presented to the Court for declaratory relief
after Trial.

Mr. Holbrook made certain motions to the Court for
14

such motions for declaratory relief by denying Mr, Holbrookes
request for attorneys' fees and for special damages to impose
liability on the injunction bond. (Tr. at R. 4844-46).

The Court,

however, did specifically, independent of the jury, rule that Mr.
Holbrook had no further obligations under the contracts except to
pay a sum, described by the Court as an "equitable" payment for
access to the names on the customer list that Mr. Holbrook had been
working with while associated with Firemaster. (Tr. at R. 4844-46,
R. 3728-29)
Pursuant to Section 8 of each of the contracts between
the parties, (R. 42-46, 92-95, 148-151) Firemaster was paid a
substantial portion of the proceeds from each sale (generally from
25% to 57% of each transaction) to perform certain general services
defined

by

services.

Firemaster

to

include

bookkeeping

and

accounting

In pre-trial proceedings Mr. Holbrook requested by way

of a motion for partial summary judgment for an accounting, that
because of his payments to Firemaster under the contracts for
services in Section 8 of the contracts, that Firemaster should be
required to perform an independent accounting and pay for the
expenses thereof in order to clearly establish the amounts owed
Mr. Holbrook under contracts between the parties (R. 974-991, 10601297, 1408-13, 1419-35, 1436-57).
(R. 1621-24).

The Court denied such motion.

Thereafter, Mr. Holbrook was required to hire and

pay his own independent accountant to determine such information.
The cost of such work was set forth in Mr. Holbrook's motion for
costs and attorney's fees filed after trial. (R. 3343-49).

Mr.

Holbrook has never been reimbursed these amounts.
Mr. Holbrook made claims that Firemaster's actions in
15

uiiv-icJ.paying commission and overcharging for deductions from such
commissions were done in an intentional pattern of racketeering.
(R. 1332-65)• Firemaster brought multiple motions to dismiss those
racketeering

claims which were

responded to by memoranda in

opposition and multiple amended complaints. (R. 198-221, 667-701,
713-737A, 811-841, 1332-69, 1458-81, 1529-91, 1606-17, 1618-20,
1626-38, 1671-74).

At the final hearing on this issue, the Court

dismissed the Federal and Utah State Racketeering claims of Mr.
Holbrook based upon it's stated decision that California law
applied

to

the

conduct

between

the

parties

and

whereas

no

California racketeering claim had been made, the Court dismissed
all racketeering charges.

(Tr. at R. 5158-68, 5174-91).

Firemaster brought various motions in limine the day
before trial, one of which was specifically aimed at limiting Mr.
Holbrook's right to bring the issue of lost profits to the jury's
attention.(R. 3034-45, 3137-42).

Mr. Holbrook's Second Amended

Complaint alleges at paragraph 139 (R. 1369) that he was damaged
as a result of a wrongful injunction being entered.

The Court

nevertheless ruled that Mr. Holbrook could not put on evidence of
such lost profits because Mr. Holbrook specifically did not say the
words lost profits or plead the same appropriately in his complaint
according to the Court. (Tr. at R. 5005-10, 5532-33).

The Court

additionally denied Mr. Holbrook relief for such lost profits on
this issue in his post-trial request for such relief. (Tr. at R.
4808-13, 4825)
The Court permitted the issue of punitive damages to go
the jury.(R. 2743-45).

Mr. Holbrook's counsel requested that

Firemaster's financial statement be introduced into evidence, but
the Court sustained the objection of Firemaster to such evidence
16
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Firemaster as evidence for the jury to consider. (Tr. at R. 544243).

In post-trial proceedings the Court indicated that all

parties had responsibility in the failure to appropriately submit
the issue of punitive damages under Utah law to the jury, including
Plaintiff's counsel, Defense counsel and the Court. (Tr. at R.
5795-5803). Under any circumstance, the correct amount of punitive
damages could not properly be assessed under Utah Law where
evidence of the substantial net worth of Firemaster was not
admitted into evidence. See Crookston, supra.
The Plaintiff made a Motion for Directed Verdict and for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict based upon the evidence and
supported by the jury's specific findings that Mr. Holbrook had
fully performed his obligations under the contracts during the time
period they were in force, from June of 1987 through January of
1990, and that thereafter by law he had no further obligations to
perform under such contracts. (Tr. at R. 5441-2, R. 3903-12). Such
Motions for Directed Verdict and Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict were based upon the Utah Court of Appeal's rational in the
cases of Wright, supra and Kinsman, supra.

The Trial Court had

clearly made the decision, independent of the jury, that the prior
breaches by Firemaster negated any ability of Firemaster to enforce
the terms of the territory and franchise agreements against Mr.
Holbrook. (Tr. at R. 4844-46).
Upon the Court's own motion and without any apparent
motion by the parties, the Court fashioned what it termed an
"equitable" remedy in requiring Mr. Holbrook to pay the sum of
$11,014.00 in cash for access to the confidential customer list.
(Tr. at R. 4836-4847, R. 3728-29).
17

•me court further denied Mr. Holbrook's request for his
costs and attorneys' fees by making the statement that it appeared
to the Court there was no prevailing party to the Court. (Tr. at
R. 4830, 4844-46).
Firemaster brought various post-trial motions including
a motion for new trial and request for remittitur which the Trial
Court denied.
appeal.

Those claims are in part what make up Firemaster's

The remainder of Firemaster's claims in it's appeal are

claimed abuses of the Court's discretion.
The jury and Judge Brian independently found that Mr.
Holbrook had lived up to obligations for two and one-half years.
Relief was awarded him for his faithful performance under the
contracts.

Firemaster did obtain some apparently contradictory

relief as a result of the multiple special jury verdicts being
submitted to the jury, which verdicts contain potential legal
contradictions but no factual contradiction by virtue of the
chronology of events.

Such is the nature of multiple special

verdict cases. The Trial Court could and should have rectified any
inconsistencies based upon sound legal principles.

It is the duty

of the jury to find facts and the Court to apply the law. Brigham
v. Moon Lake Elec. Assn., 470 P.2d 393 (Utah 1970).
Mr.

Holbrook

introduced

as

Exhibits

at

trial

the

thousands of transactional accounting records that were generated
during his association with Firemaster to substantiate his claims.
(Tr. Exhibits 101-4182).

Mr. Holbrook and his expert accountant

were the only ones who testified they had reviewed all such
records.

Firemaster at all times had such records and in fact

obtained all such documents from Firemaster (R. 974-991, 1224-81,
1621-24).
18

The problems in such records were testified to by Mr. Holbrook.
(Tr. at R. 4416-70) and by his expert accountant, Mr. Arthur Miller
(Tr. at R. 4768-80A, 5258-81, 5585-98).
All the relevant facts in this case are those pertaining
to Firemaster's conduct from June of 19 87 through January of 19 90.
What happened after that time between these parties as a matter of
law should be easily resolvable, i.e. no contracts existed and the
parties had no further obligations by law under any contracts, with
logical legal and factual consequences to follow.

V.
SUMMARY OF FIREMASTER'S ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL

A. Firemaster claims it was damaged by the Trial Court's
abuse of discretion in not granting a continuance of the Trial.
This is much ado over nothing.

Counsel for Firemaster twice

specifically accepted the Court's motion of a brief continuance to
prepare for cross-examination of Mr. Holbrook's expert accountant
rather than continue to try for any other or further continuance.
(Tr. at R. 5243-44, 5280-81). As stated by counsel for Firemaster,
he believed that the trial was going well for his client and he did
not desire to postpone the conclusion of the Trial because of his
belief that he would prevail based upon the proceedings to that
point in time.
The Court had previously granted Firemaster a continuance
(R. 2627). The Court entered appropriate orders to protect against
surprise.

(Tr. at

R.

4269-96).

The

documents

Firemaster

complained of, the so-called "A" documents, were never introduced
as exhibits.

These exhibits were the sole reason Firemaster
19
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occurred to Firemaster.
Firemaster had adequate opportunity to perform its own
independent

accounting

on

all

records

because

they

were

Firemaster's possession, for the years 1987 through 1990.

in
Mr.

Holbrook paid Firemaster approximately $158,000 over that time
period to perform accounting and bookkeeping services for him.(Tr.
at R. 4521, Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 11 and 34).
No

abuse

of

discretion

could

have

occurred

where

Firemaster twice stipulated to accept the Court's solution of a
brief continuance, rather than pursuing it's motion, thinking it
was winning the trial.

Now that Firemaster lost, it can only be

in bad faith or frivolous that it attempts to have an extra crack
at the evidence through this appeal issue.
B.

The Court should find that the $10,000 award to

Firemaster for it's special verdict regarding it's claim for breach
of the confidentiality provisions of the written agreements should
be vacated under the this Court's ruling in Wright, supra, and
Kinsman, supra, based upon the premise that Firemaster's prior
breaches of all three contracts, and Mr. Holbrook's fulfillment of
his obligations

under all three contracts, constituted

legal

justification for Mr. Holbrook's termination of the agreements and
for excusing Mr. Holbrook from further performance under them.
Such a decision would eliminate Firemaster's appellate claim, of
inconsistent verdicts necessitating a new trial and any problems
associated with such verdict. It is the duty of the Court to apply
law to the special verdicts, Brigham, supra.
C.

The evidence amply supports the Court's entry of

judgment of $50,000 to Mr. Holbrook's on his claim for breach of
20
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and his accountant testified to actual damages of $207,546.34. (Tr.
at R. 4251, Trial Exhibits 11 and 34).

Firemaster failed to

marshall the evidence to show how or if this particular jury
verdict was in error or that there was a lack of substantial, nonspeculative evidence regarding such damage award.

Therefore,

Firemaster failed in meeting its burden on appeal and this Court
should not give the appeal on this issue any consideration.

See

Mountain States Broadcasting, infra.
D. Firemaster's request for it's attorneys' fees has the
correct situations reversed. Once this Court answers the threshold
legal question of Mr. Holbrook's obligations after his termination
of the contracts in January of 1990, it can and should find Mr.
Holbrook was the prevailing party under the contracts for the
purpose of assessing costs and attorneys' fees. This Court can and
should also base such decision as well upon the "net award"
concept, as a result of all of the damages awarded Mr. Holbrook
arising out of conduct relating to performance under the contracts
during the relevant two and one-half year period between the
parties.

See Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643

(Utah App. 1989).

Mr. Holbrook should also be the party awarded

his costs and attorneys' fees in the case by law.

See Utah Code

Annotated 78-27-56.
E. To award Firemaster damages on the notes as requested
by Firemaster under the agreements would be a ludicrous result
where the Trial Court and the jury independently corroborated each
other's decisions in finding that Mr. Holbrook had no further
duties under the contracts between the parties.

Additionally,

Firemaster has possession of the territories those notes were to
21

puiuiase ana m i s issue is moot.

The notes represent the full

purchase price of the territories with the ability by Firemaster
to award all the rights of a Firemaster franchisee, which rights
Firemaster will not transfer to Mr. Holbrook and which association
he does not want.

The notes are not collectible by virtue of

Firemaster's prior preaches of the contracts and because the
territories,

which

the

notes

pay

for,

are

in

Firemaster's

possession.
F. The use of Mr. Holbrook's counsel's emotional appeal
in closing argument, specifically any alleged "golden rule", is not
supported by specific Utah Law, but generally is an issue of
argument for the Court to consider.

The statement alleged to

violate this concept by Firemaster could hardly be substantial
enough to generate passion or prejudice to cause the jury to render
a decision based upon such passion on prejudice.
The very issue addressed by the alleged error was made
in support of Mr. Holbrook's claim that he was forced to enter into
the franchise agreements under duress. (Tr. at R. 5477-78).

The

jury specifically denied Mr. Holbrook relief on this claim (R.
2759).

Therefore in fact, Firemaster prevailed on the issue and

no prejudice has occurred to it from any
G.

alleged error.

Firemaster is not entitled to any further equitable

relief in the form of an injunction once it had been found to have
violated the terms of it's own contracts over a two and one-half
year period.

To extend equitable and contractual rights to

Firemaster after it had been found to have breached it's contracts,
to have breached its fiduciary duty to Mr. Holbrook, to have acted
in bad faith towards its performance under the contracts, to have
intentionally converted the commissions of Mr. Holbrook in a manner
22

justifying the position of punitive damages after Mr. Holbrook
fully performed his obligations under the contracts would destroy
every conceivable viable basis for awarding equitable relief. The
Court also does not have the right to re-write the parties
contracts.

See the case of Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549

(Utah 1984).

The request for a continued injunction is both moot

and not capable of being substantiated.

In fact this Court should

make a finding that the preliminary injunction was wrongful which
will support Mr. Holbrook's appeals for affirmative relief set
forth hereafter.

VI.
SUMMARY OF MR. HOLBROOKE ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL

A.

The Trial Court's failure to grant Mr. Holbrook's

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to require Firemaster to
perform a fair and impartial accounting under the contracts was
error in that there was no genuine question as to any material fact
relative to Firemaster being paid approximately $158,000 under the
contracts

for

general

services which,

among

other services,

included bookkeeping and accounting services. (See Plaintiff's
Trial Exhibits 11 and 34).

This was never rebutted at trial.

Firemaster was assigned the receivables from all sales and service
performed by Mr. Holbrook (as an example see Trial Exhibit 114),
by the invoices used by the parties at all relevant times, which
state in pertinent part as follows:
"Seller hereby assigns this Account Receivable to Master
Protection including all taxes"
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Firemaster therefore had an obligation to account for and
disburse such funds from these receivables to Mr. Holbrook under
the contracts as well as under a fiduciary duty associated with the
handling of such funds implied at law. (R. 42-46, 92-95, 148-151).
By virtue of the Trial Court's denial of his motion, Mr. Holbrook
was required to hire and pay his own accounting expert.

Based on

the jury's and Court's findings, Firemaster should now be ordered
to pay all such costs.
B. The Trial Court's decision to dismiss Mr. Holbrook's
Utah State and Federal racketeering claims for relief on the basis
of a choice of law provision in the contracts rather than based
upon tort choice of law precedent, was clear reversible error.
Tort law, rather than contract law should have been applied to the
choice of law decision.

If the Trial Court had done so, it would

have found Utah law applied and denied the motion to dismiss. Such
a

decision

proceedings.

requires

a

remand

of

such

claims

for

further

The award of attorneys' fees to Firemaster as a

result of such dismissal should also be vacated.
C.

The Trial Court's refusal at trial to permit the

Plaintiff to put on evidence of lost profits relating to the
wrongful imposition of an injunction, when that specific language
had been included in the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, (R.
1369), and where Firemaster had requested the injunction, been
required to post a $75,000 bond if such injunction was found to be
wrongful, and where the Court had ample evidence to support an
award of the full bond to Mr. Holbrook was clear reversible error
on the part of the Court.

Mr. Holbrook should be awarded the

$75,000 injunction bond since Firemaster already requested such
bond amount based on its representation that $75,000 was Mr.
24

be permitted to request such damages from a new jury or the Court.
D.

The award to Mr. Holbrook of only $5,872.36 in

punitive damages on his conversion cause of action was clear
reversible error where the District

Court

refused to permit

evidence of Firemaster's substantial net worth to go the jury.
This clearly violates the criteria relating to punitive damages
under Utah law. See Crookston, supra.

In post-trial proceedings,

the Court acknowledged there was error in the manner this issue was
handled on the part of Plaintiff's Counsel, the Court and Defense
counsel.

(Tr. at R.

corrected.

5796-99) and

that the

issue

should be

The correct result is to permit a new trial solely as

to what is the correct amount of punitive damages to be charged
against Firemaster.

See the Utah

case of Bundy v. Century

Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984).
E.
Plaintiff's

The
Motion

Notwithstanding

the

Trial
for

Court

erred

Directed

Verdict,

or

Mr.

in

refusing

Verdict

and

Holbrook's

Declaratory Relief on the issue that Mr. Holbrook

to

grant

Judgment

Motion

for

should be

relieved of any and all further obligations under the contracts
after his termination in January of 1990, including the $10,000
award to Firemaster.

The Utah cases of Wright, supra. Kinsman,

supra and Cunningham, supra all dictate such a result and to find
otherwise was clear, reversible error by the Court.
F.

The Trial Court erred in refusing to award Mr.

Holbrook his costs and attorneys fees as the prevailing party under
the contracts. (See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits, 1 pgs. 21 and 22,
Exhibit 2, pgs. 22-23, and Exhibit 3, pgs. 22-23).
The Trial Court also failed to award Mr. Holbrook his
25

Mountain States Broadcasting, supra.
The Trial Court also should have awarded Mr. Holbrook his
costs and

attorneys

fees under the provisions

of Utah

Code

Annotated 78-27-5 6, where Firemaster was found to have breached its
fiduciary duty to Mr. Holbrook, to have breached the implied
covenant of good

faith

and

fair dealings

in contracts, and

tortiously converted Mr. Holbrook's funds in a manner justifying
the imposition of punitive damages.
If Utah Code Annotated 7 8-27-5 6 has any validity under
Utah law, it is an abuse of discretion to not apply it against
Firemaster in this case.
G.

The District Court erred in requiring Mr. Holbrook

to pay the sum $11,014. in cash, as an "equitable" payment to
Firemaster for access to the confidential customer list. The Court
cannot re-write the parties' contract by the use of equitable
relief.

See Cunningham, supra. Firemaster was not entitled to

equitable relief from any Court by virtue of it's own willful and
intentional tortious conduct toward Mr. Holbrook.

VII.
REPLY TO FIREMASTER'S ARGUMENTS

A.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
REFUSING TO CONTINUE TRIAL OF THE CASE.
Firemaster
failure

to

timely

claimed

that

Mr.

Holbrook's

provide

information

allegedly

prejudicial
vital

to

Firemaster's defenses should have caused the Court to grant it's
motion for continuance of the Trial.
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A very simple resolution exists of this issue.

Counsel

for Firemaster, because he believed his client was winning at trial
and did not want to lose his momentum, twice waived the motion for
a

continuance by

Stipulation,

(Tr. at R.

Therefore no error can be ascribed.

5237-44, 5280-81).

Firemaster's Stipulation at

trial clearly shows that this issue is meritless and should be
summarily dismissed.
The standard Firemaster must otherwise meet in claiming
error is that the Trial Court abused it's discretion in failing to
grant the continuance requested.

State v. Humphreys 707 P.2nd 109

(Utah 1985) .
The record is clear that in this case the original
accounting records were all in the possession of Firemaster. (R.
42-46, 92-95, 148-151). Firemaster was paid approximately $158,000
to maintain such records, perform bookkeeping services relating to
and account for such funds. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 11, 34 and
see Section 8 of each of Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3).

Fire-

master at all times was on notice and understood these records to
be the critical exhibits for trial. See Defendant's Response to
Plaintiff's Requests for Production of Documents. (R. 657-662, 858866) .
Mr. Holbrook made a motion to the Court that Firemaster
be required to perform an independent accounting on the funds it
had received and was responsible for under the contracts. (R. 974991).

The Court denied such motion but required Firemaster to

provide access to those records when it had failed under previous
document requests to adequately provide copies of the thousands of
pages of records required in this case. (R. 1621-24).
Firemaster took Mr. Holbrook's deposition on at least two
27

at those times but choose not to do so. (R. 546-48, 1653-54).
The Court ordered of the parties that any documents not
timely produced prior to trial would be inadmissable at trial. (R.
4285-86).

The documents complained about by Firemaster, the "A"

documents, were not introduced as exhibits at trial and are not
part of the record.

In fact, Mr. Holbrook sought to have such

documents suppressed under attorney-work product and other similar
rules. (Tr. at R. 2629-41).
No prejudicial error has occurred to Firemaster from the
alleged

failure to obtain the

"A" documents

complained

about,

since:
1) Such documents were not introduced as exhibits at
trial and are not a part of the record;
2) Firemaster had an opportunity in pre-trial depositions
to ask Mr. Holbrook and Mr. Miller the questions which were in
essence what made up the "A" documents Firemaster is complaining
about;
3) Firemaster had all of the actual accounting records
upon which Mr. Holbrook's and Mr. Miller's testimony were based,
for years prior to trial;
4) Firemaster

chose

not

to

do

it's

own

independent

accounting;
5) Firemaster received one continuance prior to trial to
prepare for an additional approximate one month;
6) Firemaster twice accepted a second limited continuance
by stipulation during the Trial to have an opportunity to further
prepare for the cross-examination of Mr. Miller, rather than seek
a longer continuance, in order to press it's perceived advantage;
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8)

Firemaster did have it's own expert review the

documents in question and he provided detailed testimony attempting
to counter the findings of Mr. Miller.
Clearly no prejudice has occurred to Firemaster in terms
of their ability to understand and critic the testimony of Mr.
Holbrook

and Mr. Miller.

Firemaster

had

the

transactional

documents at all relevant times and it stipulated during trial to
proceed based upon its perceived advantage. Firemaster took as its
trial approach the same approach it had toward the accounting
records it was paid $158,000 by Mr. Holbrook to account for, i.e.,
let's wait and see if we get caught! Now it has been caught by the
jury, it wants to go back for a second chance to make things sound
not so bad.

The only abuse of discretion on this issue would be

to support Firemaster's thinking in this regard. The Trial Court's
refusal to grant any other continuance as argued by Firemaster was
not an abuse of discretion under the standard of Humphreys, supra
and is not reversible error specifically because Firemaster waived
this claim.

B.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT
FIREMASTER A NEW TRIAL
The premise to begin with in considering this issue is
that there is a strong presumption in favor of a jury verdict. See
Batty v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1978); Weber Basin Water
Conservancy Dist. v. Skeen, 328 P.2d 730 (Utah 1958); Price-Orem
Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55 (Utah
1986).
The case which is directly on point and should be controlling
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decision in the case of Wright v. Westside Nursery (787 P.2d 508,
Utah App. 1990).

In the Wright case, this Court has already ruled

on a similar fact situation where an employment agreement existed
to employ the selling owner of a business as an employee for a
particular period of time after the sale of the business to the new
owner. The selling owner converted funds while so employed and was
terminated, appropriately according to the jury, for conversion of
funds belonging to the new owner. The terminated employee countersued

for breach

of his employment

agreement because of his

termination and the jury found for him as well.

The Trial Court

in the Wright, supra case, faced the factually contradictory jury
verdicts and made the prudent decision on the law, that the prior
breaches of the employment agreement justified the termination of
the employee, thus prohibiting the employee from relying upon the
employment agreement for relief.

The Court then set aside the

award to the employee for wrongful termination,,
The Court

in the Wright, supra

case, at page 517

indicated that:
"Thus we hold that the Court appropriately dismissed the
wrongful termination claim since Wright had good cause,
as a matter of law, to terminate Humphreys."
At page 516 the Court stated:
"It is a basic tenet of agency law that [a] principal is
privileged to discharge before the time fixed by the
contract of employment an agent who has committed such
a violation of duty that his conduct constitutes a
material breach of contract."
Such a ruling should also apply to the principal agent
(Franchisor/Franchisee) relationship in the extent case.
In the case of Brigham v. Moon Lake Electrical Assn, 47 0
P.2d 393 (Utah 1970) the Supreme Court considered the situation of
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special verdicts that found the Plaintiff to have suffered damages
and also be contributorily negligent.

The Court held the special

verdicts were not inconsistent and thereby void, since in special
verdicts, the jury finds the facts and the court applies the law.
That is what the Trial Court should have done in this instance,
applied the law of Wright, supra and Kinsman, supra.
In the Utah case of Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const.
Co. , 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), the Court indicated that if a party
claims a verdict to be inconsistent it should object prior to
dismissal of the jury, or it will be barred from raising the issue
on appeal. Firemaster made no objection while the jury was present
and should therefore be barred by its failure to object.
In this case, the jury verdicts clearly found that during
the critical time period of June, 1987 through January, 1990, Mr.
Holbrook fulfilled all his obligations under all the contracts.
(R. 2729-37). Similarly, the jury unanimously found that during the
time period of June, 1987, through January, 1990, Firemaster
breached all three contracts, tortiously converted funds belonging
to Mr. Holbrook, breached their fiduciary duty to Mr. Holbrook, and
breached their implied duty of good faith and fair dealing relating
to those contracts to Mr. Holbrook.

The Jury also found the acts

of conversion by Firemaster justified the imposition of punitive
damages against it. (R. 2743-45). Mr. Holbrook therefore had good
cause, as a matter of law, for not continuing to honor any
obligations

under

the

contracts

as

of

January,

1990,

and

thereafter.
Question No. 4 in the special verdict form in favor of
Firemaster (R. 2726-28) does not ask the specific question, did
Mr. Holbrook breach the agreements referenced in the jury verdict?
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provides the jury an opportunity to perhaps decide, that if Mr.
Holbrook utilized the customer list in violation of the trade
secret agreement, which was an exhibit at trial (Defendant's Trial
Exhibit V ) , that is the basis for the jury's decision. Whether the
special verdict form was misleading, or provided the jury the
opportunity to make a decision independent, but not necessarily
contradictory to, other findings of the jury, is a question not
answered by the special verdicts and a question for the Court.
Under any circumstance, based on the Wright, supra
reasoning, and the duty of the Court to apply the law as set forth
in Brigham, supra, the multiple, intentional and repeated prior
breaches of all the agreements by Firemaster over a two and onehalf year period constitute legal justification for Mr. Holbrook
to refuse to

continue to perform

his obligations

under the

contracts. The law of performance under contracts would be totally
nonsensical if one party could intentionally and willfully breach
the contract, could maliciously convert the funds of the other
party to a contract, be caught, not resolve the problem and then
still be able to require the injured party to perform under those
very contracts that the converting and breaching party has treated
with disdain.

As stated in this Court's decision in the Kinsman,

supra, case at page 213 "such a result will not be tolerated."

See

also Wright, supra and Cunningham, supra.
This

Court

therefore

should

deal with

Firemaster's

request for a new trial by vacating the $10,000 award to Firemaster
by answering the threshold legal question of how an innocent party
to a breached contract should conduct himself or herself once the
other party to such contract has breached the agreement.
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The

answer should be that no obligation exists to perform once the
contract has been breached by the other side.

Based on this

answer, Firemaster is not entitled to a new trial as requested.

C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING JUDGMENT FOR
$50,000 ON THE FRANCHISEE'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AND IN NOT REQUIRING A
REMITTITUR OF THAT AWARD AS A CONDITION TO NOT GRANTING A NEW
TRIAL.
1. The $50,000 Damage Award Is Supported By the Type of
"Substantial Evidence" Required by Utah Law
Regarding this particular claim, the appellant fails in
its primary obligation to marshall the evidence as set forth in the
cases of Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713
P.2d 55 (Utah 1986); State v. Larsen, 180 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992); Zions v. Overthrust Oil & Gas Corp., 179 Utah Adv.
Rep 10 (Utah 19 92), and Mountain States Broadcasting, supra.

On

the basis alone, these appellate claims are doomed.
In the case of appeals of jury verdicts, in order to
overturn such a verdict, the appellant must marshall the evidence
in favor of the verdict and show, notwithstanding such marshalling
of the evidence that the decision of the jury was unsupported by
"substantial evidence". The act of arguing only selected evidence
favorable to their position as Firemaster did on pages 30-35 of its
brief,

dooms

dismissal.

the

challenge

of

Firemaster

and

is

cause

for

See State v. Larsen, supra at 15.

Notwithstanding Firemaster's failure to marshall the
evidence, substantial evidence did exist for the finding by the
jury that Firemaster had breached its implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in a manner and in an amount well in excess
of $50,000.
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in marshalling the evidence, Firemaster

should have

referenced this Court to and argued why at least the evidence set
forth below was allegedly not substantial enough for purposes of
meeting the standard to support a jury verdict:
1.
Holbrook

Firemaster could not make up it's mind whether Mr.

continued

to work

under

his

independent

contractor

agreement or some other agreement after he entered into the
franchise agreements on April 11, 1988. Firemaster clearly wanted
Mr. Holbrook to be bound by the confidentiality provisions of the
contracts

which

benefited

Firemaster.

On

the

other

hand,

Firemaster did not want to be bound by the commission provisions
of such agreement and provided totally contradictory evidence among
its own representatives on this issue. (Tr. at R. 4381, 4382-83,
4736, 4737-41, 5714-16, 5716a-5719, Testimony of Bob Wiles, 566164).

Thus, Firemaster

in fact treated

the

issues

in such

independent contractor agreement that protected them as at all
times

in

effect, but

the

provisions

in

such

contract

that

benefitted Mr. Holbrook as terminated. This specifically evidenced
itself when Firemaster sought to unilaterally reduce Mr. Holbrook's
travel allowance commission in this area from 25% to 15% (Tr. at
R. 4430-32, 4452-53, 4462-63).

This type of action on the part of

Firemaster occurred repeatedly.
2. Mr. Holbrook was informed that the purchase price of
his franchise areas was based upon a dollar for dollar formula that
meant for every dollar of sales generated in that particular area
he would be charged $1 for the purchase price, yet he was never
provided evidence of the dollar sales to substantiate this amount
as he requested. (Tr. at R. 4393-94, 4402--02a).
3.

The documents Firemaster claims to be confidential
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were the actual invoices generated from each sale or service. (As
an example see Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 114).

In order to

correctly account for sales and services and identify the correct
commission and charges, the invoices on those sales would be
required to be reviewed
function.

in order to perform

such accounting

However, Firemaster refused to provide those invoices

to their independent contractors and franchisees such as Mr.
Holbrook. (Tr. at R. 4401-12, 4595), or to let them retain a copy.
The IC's (independent contractors) and FO's (franchise owners) were
totally at the mercy of Firemaster to account properly, and paid
Firemaster a large sum for such "privilege" (R. 42-46, 92-95, 148151, Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 11 and 34).
4. Mr. Holbrook testified to multiple problems relating
to sales and service commissions that were due him. (Tr. at R.
4416-70).

Firemaster never refuted such claims by any evidence.
5.

agent

for

Robin Phillips, at all relevant times the principal
Firemaster,

threatened

to

reduce

Mr.

Holbrook's

commissions after the one year grace period in the contracts
expired

and

stated

that

he

could

receive

no

more

work,

notwithstanding he had "purchased" such franchise areas, until he
executed the schedule reducing his commissions.

However, Robin

Phillips

on

refused

to

counter-sign

the

document

Firemaster because he said he didn't need to.

behalf

of

See Trial Exhibits

8, 9, and 10. (Tr. at R. 4517-20, 4756-57).
6.

Shaani

Leary

testified

and

corroborated

Mr.

Holbrook's testimony that he had been promised by Ron Bogardus, the
Firemaster representative who sold the franchises to him, that Mr.
Holbrook's commissions would stay the same by purchasing the
franchise areas as under his independent contractor agreement.(Tr.
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7 . Shaani Leary testified that she believed Firemaster's
treatment of Bard Holbrook was unfair. (Tr. at R. 4668).
8.
sales

and

Robin Phillips testified that all proceeds for all

services

from

all

ICs

Firemaster. (Tr. at R. 4693-95).

and

FOs

went

directly

to

Robin Phillips testified that it

was not the Firemaster policy to give back corrections on sales
summaries to the contractors and franchisees so they could review
them for accuracy. (Tr. at R. 4700-01).

Mr. Phillips testified

that one must look at the invoices to see if the correct amount of
commission is paid (Tr. at R. 4701-03), yet Firemaster claimed the
invoices were confidential and refused to permit the ICs and FOs
such as Mr. Holbrook to retain the invoices (Tr. at R. 4703).
Therefore no procedure existed for Mr. Holbrook to verify the
accuracy of the bookkeeping and accounting that he paid Firemaster
to perform on his behalf; and trust only got him deeper in the
hole.
9. Firemaster had Mr. Holbrook perform services and paid
commissions under a formula calculation which permitted them to
earn a profit from sales taxes charged for the job. (Tr. at R.
4710).

Mr. Phillips referred to this profit as a "handling fee"

(Tr. at R. 4710-11).
10.

Robin Phillips, the principal local manager at all

relevant times of the Firemaster office for the State of Utah,
testified in his deposition in 1990, after this litigation had been
filed that at that time he still did not know why Firemaster
received it's percentage from each of the invoices sold and
serviced by Mr. Holbrook
knowledge

indicates

he

(Tr. at R. 4715-16).
did

not
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know

why Mr.

This lack of
Holbrook

paid

Firemaster $158,000.

How could Firemaster, under Mr. Phillips

direction, then provide the services it contracted for but did not
know it had an obligation to do?
11.

Mr. Phillips testified as to problems relating to

pricing of parts (Tr. at R. 4717-22). Mr. Phillips also testified
pursuant to Trial Exhibit 13, as to what the basis was for
Firemaster charging a "extra materials charge" (Tr. at R. 4723-2 8
and Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit

13).

Such computation is not

contained in the contracts, was not agreed to by Mr. Holbrook and
clearly shows bad faith.

It is also contradicted by Mr. Bob Wiles

of Firemaster, the general manager of the entire company in
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 14.
12.

Mr. Phillips verified that even though Firemaster

was paid to perform accounting and bookkeeping services, they did
not make any effort to verify the price of parts on invoices and
thus charged Mr. Holbrook the highest price available. (Tr. at R.
4732-36).
13. Mr. Phillips admitted there were problems in keeping
track of lead sheets and paying the appropriate commissions to Mr.
Holbrook for such leads, notwithstanding the fact that Firemaster
was paid substantial sums of money to do so. (Tr. at R. 4742-44).
14. Mr. Phillips admitted Firemaster had no bookkeeping
procedure to keep track of commissions to be paid to Mr. Holbrook
for second annual inspections which were due him, and for which
Firemaster was paid to account. (Tr. at R. 4745-4746).
15.

Firemaster

admitted

that

it was

receiving a

substantial proportion of each invoice to provide advertising
services for it's franchisees and independent contractors, on sales
of almost 1,800,000 in 1989.

Yet for that year it only paid
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;>z,ooo. /B tor advertising notwithstanding receipt from Mr, Holbrook
alone approximately of in excess of $100,000 in that year for
general services including advertising. (Tr. at R. 4748-50).

See

also Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 15.
16.

Mr. Arthur Miller was the sole independent person

to review the eleven volumes of accounting records comprising in
excess of 4,000 Exhibits and found that seven types of exceptions
existed as to how Mr. Holbrook should have been paid under the
contracts but was not. (Tr. at R. 4768-4780A, 5258-81, 5585-98).
See also Trial Exhibits 22-31 and 32.
17. Mr. Miller testified that there were three specific
methods of material overcharges that were used over time to take
ever increasing sums of money from Mr. Holbrook's commissions in
violation of the contracts and in a manner that had he not
terminated his contracts, would have caused him to suffer a pro
rata greater loss over time than had previously been forced upon
him by Firemaster.

He determined this solely by going through

these voluminous records.
(Tr. at R. 5266-79).

No one from Firemaster ever did this.

In other words, the more money Mr. Holbrook

was making, the more he would have been losing over time based upon
Firemaster's actions.
18. Mr. Miller testified that the exceptions to the way
that Mr. Holbrook should have been paid were done on a consistent
basis, thus indicating an intentional pattern, on the part of
Firemaster. (Tr. at R. 5275).

See also Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit

32 which is the report of Arthur Miller.
19.

Mr. Miller testified to a wrongful method of

rounding percentages in every calculation in favor of Firemaster,
which although the dollar amount would not be significant regarding
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one independent contractor or franchisee such as Mr. Holbrook, over
many individuals it would be a substantial sum of money. (Tr. at
R. 5593, 5596-97).
20.

Alaina

Coffman

testified

that

Robin

Phillips

instructed her not to provide Mr. Holbrook any work unless he
signed the commission modification, Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 8
and 9. (Tr. at R. 5 615-16) even though Mr. Holbrook was current in
his work. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 10).
21.

Ms. Coffman corroborated there was no accounting

method of Firemaster to account for commission payments to Mr.
Holbrook for second annual inspections (Tr. at R. 5616-17) even
though he had been promised such commissions by contract and
Firemaster was paid to do accounting for Mr. Holbrook.
22. Alaina Coffman testified she was instructed to never
to point out or correct errors against the accounts of the
independent contractors and franchisees such as Mr. Holbrook, but
only to correct those that were against Firemaster and would
therefore result in an advantage to Firemaster. (Tr. at R. 5 61920) .
23.

Ms. Coffman further testified she was informed it

was the job of the independent contractor or franchisee to catch
any

errors, notwithstanding

Firemaster

retained

the

critical

accounting documents, and was paid a substantial sum from each
invoice to perform bookkeeping and accounting services. (Tr. at R.
5620).
24.

Ms. Coffman and Robin Phillips had a conversation

after she had determined that there were errors in the manner in
which commissions were being paid Mr. Holbrook and others, where
she was instructed that Firemaster would not go back to fix past
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prooiems relating to commissions unless caught and brought up by
the independent contractor or franchisee. (Tr. at R. 5623).
25.

Ms. Coffman was instructed by Robin Phillips that

if she gave Mr. Holbrook the higher commission he was entitled to
under the agreements, to make up the loss of income to Firemaster
by charging him an extra materials charge. (Tr. at R. 5624).
26.

Ms. Coffman was informed if she could not identify

a part sold on an invoice of Mr. Holbrook's, rather than to clarify
the issue with Mr. Holbrook, to charge him the highest price for
the part even though Firemaster was paid substantial sums to do Mr.
Holbrook's bookkeeping and accounting. (Tr. at R. 5626).
27.

Ms. Coffman was told by Mr. Phillips to charge the

extra materials charge for parts replaced through the All Risk
Insurance Program.

In such All Risk

Insurance Program, Mr.

Holbrook provided

parts he had purchased

from Firemaster

to

customers free of charge to the customer as a result of their prior
purchase of the All Risk Insurance.

Mr. Holbrook was then to be

reimbursed the parts at no charge from Firesmaster.

However,

Firemaster then charged Mr. Holbrook the extra materials charge for
parts for which he could not charge the customer, thus resulting
in a loss to him. (Tr. at R. 5630-32).
28.

Mr. Ron Bogardus testified there were benefits to

the ownership of the franchise, that by ownership, the customers
belong

to

the

franchisee.

(Tr. at

R.

5375-77).

Then, he

contradicted himself and stated the contracts make the accounts
Firemaster's.

Firemaster contended through the entire trial that

the customers were Firemaster's confidential customers, in complete
contradiction of the alleged benefit on ownership as set forth by
Mr. Bogardus.
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29.

The jury was informed by Mr. Arthur Miller, Mr.

Holbrook's accounting expert, that Firemaster had underpaid and
overcharged Mr. Holbrook the sum of $37,513.98. See Trial Exhibit
32.
30.
$158,206.00

Plaintiff testified that he had paid Firemaster
for

general

services,

including

bookkeeping

and

accounting services and advertising. (Trial Exhibits No. 11, 34).
31.

It was stipulated and admitted, that Firemaster

intentionally and unilaterally altered the terms of the rural Utah
franchise

contract

(Plaintiff's

Trial

Exhibit

3)

regarding

commissions earned by Mr. Holbrook in the Brigham City area. (Tr.
at R. 5198-99).
32.

Tom

Kennedy, the

corporate

representative

of

Firemaster who negotiated the independent contractor agreement with
Mr. Holbrook on behalf of Firemaster, testified he promised Mr.
Holbrook certain commissions. (Tr. at R. 5074-94).

Later Robin

Phillips, the district manager for Firemaster in Salt Lake City
sought to unilaterally modify such commissions. (Plaintiff's Trial
Exhibits 8 and 9).
33. Mr. Arthur Miller testified that while he could not
state there definitely was fraud in the transactions, his failure
to so state was only as result of not being able to review all the
documents he needed to come to such a conclusion. (Tr. at R. 527279) .
In its brief, Firemaster failed to marshall any of the
above cited evidence to the Court, failed to argue any of the
evidence testified to that Mr. Miller found in the 4,000 plus
accounting exhibits, (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 101-4182), and
failed to show how such accounting exhibits do not prove an
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taking from the accounts of Mr. Holbrook.
The total failure to marshall the evidence by Firemaster,
and address any or all of the issues set forth above, coupled with
Mr. Holbrook's evidence of payment to Firemaster of $158,206 for
its

general

services, including

advertising, bookkeeping

and

accounting, of $11,836 in franchise fee purchase payments and the
$37,513 testified to by Mr. Miller, clearly shows that there was
substantial evidence to support a jury award to Mr. Holbrook of
$50,000 on the claim of breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in contracts.

Utah law is clear that once

a claim has been presented to a jury and a verdict has been
rendered, all presumptions are in favor of the validity of the
verdict and judgment.

See Joseph v. W.H. Grow, 348 P.2d 935 (Utah

1960) .
Further,

under

Utah

law,

after

a

jury

trial,

a

presumption arises that any judgment resulting therefrom should not
be disturbed unless the one attacking it meets the requirements of
showing

that

any

error

complained

of

is

substantial

and

prejudicial, so much so that the trial result would have been
different is the error was corrected.
P. 2d 6 64 (Utah 19 6 6);
240 (Utah 1955);

See Hall v. Blackman, 417

Bowden v. Denver and R.G. W. R.R., 28 6 P. 2d

Batt v. State, 503 P.2d 855 (Utah 1972).

In the case of Batty v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040 (Utah
1978), the Court held that the amount of the verdict was an
exclusive matter for the jury and unless the amount awarded clearly
indicates the disregard of competent evidence, or the influence of
passion or prejudice, such award must stand.
Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558 (Utah 1984).
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See also Meyer v.
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jury's verdicts.

Substantial evidence in fact exists to support the jury's verdict
and their appeal is thus doomed. Therefore, the verdict of $50,000
to Mr. Holbrook, as supported by the evidence cited above, must be
affirmed.

2. Firemaster's Argument That the Jury's Own Special
Verdicts, Granting an Award of $5,891.35 To the Franchisee for the
Franchisor's Breach of Contract Claims Set the Outer Limit on the
Total Amount of Damages Recoverable on those Claims is Erroneous.
This argument is totally unsupported by law and is
erroneous.

Not only did Firemaster fail in its' appellant brief

to marshall evidence to support this claim, it cannot and did not
point to any specific rule of law that supports its' argument. The
reason it cannot is because no such rule of law exists.
Clearly, as an independent cause of action, the implied
covenant of fair dealing and good faith in contracts carries it's
own right of damages. See Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco LTD,
497 (Utah 1980).

618 P.2d

The jury which heard all the evidence has the

right to assess the evidence and make a determination as to the
correct amount of damages.

See Joseph, supra.

Firemaster totally failed in it's burden to marshall the
evidence

to

show

the

support

if

any,

for

the

jury

award.

Firemaster did exactly what appellants do when they are unhappy
with well-substantiated

jury awards against them.

They have

attempted to marshall their evidence (see Appellants Brief, pages
34-35), while ignoring the well founded rule as described in the
Utah cases cited above of Price-Orem Inv. Co., supra: State v.
Larsen,

supra;

and

Zions,

supra.,
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which

indicate

that

an

position and the failure to marshall the evidence against their
position dooms their appeal.
Where multiple special verdicts are submitted to the
jury, the jury was given the right to choose to compensate Mr.
Holbrook through his breach of contract claims and in other
respects through the multiple breaches of the implied duty of good
faith

and

fair

dealing

in

contracts

as

supported

by

the

"substantial evidence" requirement set forth above.
The real issue Firemaster should be asking is, was there
a double recovery to Mr. Holbrook?

This clearly is not permitted.

See Brigham City Sand and Gravel v. Machinery Center, Inc., et.al. ,
613 P.2d 510 (Utah 1980).
totaled

$207,546.00

Mr. Holbrook testified that his damages

under

three

different

(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 11 and 34).
in

compensatory

damages.

Therefore

types

of

loss.

He only received $85,000
no

double

recovery

has

occurred.
As stated in the Utah case of Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d
953 (Utah 1983), at page 956:
"Although an award of damages based only on speculation cannot
be upheld, it is generally recognized that some degree of
uncertainty in the evidence of damages will not suffice to
relieve a defendant from recompensing a wronged Plaintiff.
As long as there is some rational basis for a damage award,
it is the wrongdoer who must assume the risk of some
uncertainty."
A rational basis does exist for the $50,000 award to Mr.
Holbrook.

The jury clearly believed services Firemaster was paid

to perform, either were not in whole, or in part performed.
jury also believed such actions to be in bad faith!

The

In order to

right the wrong, the jury awarded Mr. Holbrook damages, but less
than one-third

of

the

amount

he
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requested.

This

award

is

substantiated by the evidence and not limited by the existence or
alternative

forms of

relief, so long as no double recovery

occurred.

3. The Trial Court Should Not Have Required Mr. Holbrook
to Remit the $50,000.00 Damage Award as a Condition to Denying
Firemaster's Motion for a New Trial.
A remittitur is only permitted if the jury award is
obviously above any reasonable appraisal of the damages suffered.
Ruf v. Assoc, for World Travel Exchange, 351 P.2d

623 (Utah

1960)
Mr. Holbrook submitted a memorandum in opposition to this
same argument to the Trial Court (R. 4183-89).

The Trial Court

did not abuse it's discretion in refusing to require the remittitur
or grant the new trial. That is the standard this Court must look
to on this issue.

See Batty, supra.

The decision was clearly

based upon the Trial Court's independent judgment after hearing all
the

evidence,

declaring

an

independent

termination

of

Mr.

Holbrook's obligations (Tr. at R. 4844-46) and finding that the
jury verdicts were fair and the product of a fair trial (Tr. at R.
5821).

Firemaster again failed to marshall any evidence to show

that the award was excessive or not supported by substantial
evidence and this Court's review should clearly be limited to a
review of whether Judge Brian abused his discretion.

See Batty,

supra.
Mr. Holbrook's accounting expert testified to $37,513.98
in actual accounting losses to Mr. Holbrook, which losses would
have continued and increased if he did not terminate his contracts.
Mr. Holbrook testified to having been charged $158,206 for services
that were totally or substantially not rendered and $11,876 for
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actions.

Mr. Holbrook did not receive a total award of

$207,546

but only a total award of $91,807. The jury award was less by half
of the damage amount requested by Mr. Holbrook.

To claim that to

refuse to require such a remittitur was an abuse of discretion
regarding award is unsupported by the evidence.
The complexity of multiple claims for relief and having
those claims submitted to a jury by multiple special verdicts with
the prospect of relief being awarded under alternate theories,
should not be cause for error to Mr. Holbrook so long as no double
recovery has occurred.

See Brigham City Sand and Gravel, supra.

It is clear the jury chose to award Mr. Holbrook damages under
different theories of relief for the actions of Firemaster during
the period of June 1987 to January 1990.
Mr. Holbrook received compensatory damages of $30,032.71,
under his claim for conversion plus punitive damages of $5,872.36.
He received $5,891.35 for his breach of contract claims.

He

received $1.00 for his breach of fiduciary duty claim, and $50,000
for his claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.

These damages could have all been awarded as part

of the breach of contract claims and there would be no claim by
Firemaster

of

an

excessive

or

duplicative

award.

This

is

especially true where Mr. Holbrook testified to damages of $207,546
(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 11 and 34). When the award is split
among various claims for relief, but is not duplicative, it is not
excessive or even erroneous.
It is interesting to note that Mr. Robert Minor, the jury
foreman is an attorney.

Another of the jurors was an accountant.

If such an educated jury could not avoid awarding duplicate relief
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when faced with multiple special verdict forms, it is not likely
any jury could.
Only an excessive or duplicative award based upon the
jury misapplying the facts or law, or failing to take into account
proven facts, or making findings clearly against the weight of the
evidence should be cause for a remittitur.
366 P.2d

701

(Utah 1961).

See Wellman v. Noble,

Where Firemaster failed again to

marshall the evidence in support of its position, this Court has
no basis to determine if Judge Brian abused his discretion in
denying this motion of Firemaster, and therefore its appeal is
doomed.

See State v. Larsen, supra at 15.

D. FIREMASTER IS NOT THE "PREVAILING PARTY" ON THE
PARTIES' BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS FOR PURPOSES OF RECOVERING IT'S
ATTORNEY'S FEES.
This Court should answer the threshold legal question in
the case by striking the $10,000 award to Firemaster under the
Wright, supra and Kinsman, supra precedents, and this issue would
be disposed of easily against Firemaster.
As set forth in each contract, Plaintiff's Exhibits 1,2
and 3, Firemaster provided would be reimbursed all its costs and
attorneys fees if it was forced to enforce any breaches of the
agreements.

Both Utah and California law make this obligation

mutual. (R. 3195-3350).

See Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56.5 which

states:
"A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either
party that prevails in a civil action based upon any
promissory note, written contract or other writing
executed after April 29, 1986, when the provision of the
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow
at least one party to recover attorney's fees."
See also West's annotated California Civil Code Section 1717, a
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herein by this reference.
Based on the contracts and the above referenced statutes,
Mr. Holbrook is entitled to his costs and attorneys fees for having
to enforce the contracts against Firemaster. Mr. Holbrook honored
all his contracts for two and one-half years. Only after he could
endure Firemaster's abuses no longer did he cease to honor the
contracts.
rewarded

Such honor by Mr. Holbrook should be recognized and

by this

Court.

Conversely, the

lack

of honor by

Firemaster should be penalized by an award of costs and attorneys'
fees to Mr. Holbrook.
However, if the Court were to look at the situation as
argued under the case of Mountain States Broadcasting Co., supra,
where the party in whose favor the "net" judgment is entered
becomes the prevailing party, it is clear that Mr. Holbrook was the
"net" prevailing party in this case.

His damages were $91,000,

all as a result of actions of Firemaster during the existence of
the

contracts

for

sales

and

operating under the contracts.

services

of Mr. Holbrook while

Even if Firemaster retains it's

$10,000 judgment, Mr. Holbrook clearly is the "net winner"and
should have been awarded his costs and attorneys' fees.
Once this Court addresses the threshold legal question
as set forth in the Wright, supra case and vacates the jury's award
to Firemaster

for

$10,000

for breach of the

confidentiality

provisions of the contracts as a result of its prior intentional,
willful and malicious breaches, this issue is resolved.

Once the

Court vacates such award, it is unquestioned that Mr. Holbrook was
the "prevailing party" under Utah and California law and should be
entitled to an award of his costs and attorneys' fees.
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The matter

then

should

be

remanded

to

the

Trial

Court

to

assess

the

appropriate amount of costs and attorneys' fees payable to Mr.
Holbrook based upon the language of the contracts.

E. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ENFORCE
THE NOTES AGAINST THE FRANCHISEE.
Firemaster should be forced by this Court to answer if
it has resold the territories that are the subject of the purchase
by the notes.

If Firemaster has this is a moot issue.

It is also

likely moot because Firemaster has the territories back under any
circumstance and can or has resold such territories.

Firemaster

claims Mr. Holbrook received a benefit, i.e., performing under
their name, yet Mr. Holbrook testified to $11,826 in franchise fee
payments that he was not reimbursed by the jury.
Trial Exhibits 11 and 34).

(Plaintiff's

Now Firemaster claims Mr. Holbrook

received a double benefit and should pay the full $110,000.
Firemaster has reacquired its territories.

If those

territories are sold on a dollar for dollar basis as they were to
Mr. Holbrook, they are now worth $200,000 to Firemaster based on
Firemaster's thinking.

Firemaster has not been damaged by the

reacquisition of such territories.
The Trial Court was requested by Firemaster in post-trial
motions to enforce these notes against Mr. Holbrook. (R. 335 6-84,
3402-27).

Firemaster has this fantasy that it can intentionally,

willfully and maliciously take commissions from it's independent
contractor and franchisee and still have a Court of law or equity
require the other party live up to the obligations of the contracts
Firemaster

intentionally

ignored.
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The

boldness

with

which

.™**w~ w**o.^ v.j-1-ia.iii IUI ciuurcemeni: or i:ne promissory notes
is the very attitude that convinced the

jury at trial that

Firemaster is a predatory company that should be obligated to pay
punitive damages. It is the very attitude that convinced the Trial
Court to refuse to grant Firemaster's demand for payment of the
notes and why this Court should soundly deny all Firemaster's
appeals and affirm all awards against Firemaster so that Firemaster
will recognize that it is exactly what the jury found it to be,
i.e. a thief.
Firemaster has no right to request payment on notes when
the jury found that Mr. Holbrook lived up to all his obligations
under the contracts and Firemaster breached all three agreements.
(R.

2729-37).

These

contracts

were

structured

perpetually. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 1,2 and 3).

to

continue

No evidence

was presented that Mr. Holbrook had failed to pay the payments on
the notes during the existence of the contracts.

Firemaster now

wants payment for years into the future for the purchase of an
asset they wrongfully took back into their possession.

Where is

their showing of diminished value? There was no evidence to suggest
they do not currently possess the value of the notes and therefore
they have incurred no loss.
On the other hand, Firemaster does not offer to grant Mr.
Holbrook the territories covered by the notes and an exclusive
right

to

fo

after

all

customers

in

those

territories

Firemaster's name in exchange for payment on their notes.
Bogardus

indicated

the

real

value

of

the

franchise

in
Mr.
from

Firemaster's point of view was the ownership of the customers.
Firemaster has that in its name as much as any other competitor.
Mr. Holbrook does not seek to service the customers
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in the

territories

in Firemaster's

Firemaster wants payment

name.

(Tr. at R.

on the notes

5375-77)

and the

Now

customers

in

Firemaster's name as well. Firemaster is so used to having all the
benefits and performing poorly or not at all on its obligations
from its adhesive contracts, it does not recognize when to stop its
predatory behavior.
Firemaster's
agreements

own

intentional

breaches

of

all

three

serve to estop Firemaster from either demanding or

collecting payment under the notes. The jury found that to be the
case in its special verdicts.(R.

2729-37, 2759-60).

In Mr.

Holbrook's separate post-trial request for declaratory relief,
Judge Brian independently came to the same conclusion.

(Tr. at R.

4844-46).
Notwithstanding the jury's and Trial Court's separate,
yet

identical

conclusions, after

hearing

the

evidence, that

Firemaster was not entitled to payment on the notes, Firemaster
continues to insist that it should somehow receive payment for
notes it would have received had it not breached the contracts.
If Firemaster had been paid in cash for the territories rather than
by notes, under the circumstances as found by the Court and jury
in this case, Mr. Holbrook would be entitled to a complete
reimbursement for such fees.

What Firemaster was selling in

exchange for the notes, was not customers, but a territory in its
name.

See Plaintiff's (Trial Exhibits 2 and 3 page 5, R. 80-81,

135-136.

It can sell the territories again to recover any loss.

Firemaster is simply not entitled to receive payment on the notes
given the circumstances of this case based upon Firemaster's own
actions.
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PREJUDICIALLY ALLOW THE FRANCHISEE TO URGE THE JURORS TO PLACE
THEMSELVES IN THE FRANCHISEE'S SHOES TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE
FRANCHISEE SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO HONOR HIS CONTRACTS.
Of all the cases cited by Firemaster to support its'
argument on this issue, none are Utah cases.

No Utah law exists

on point on this issue from the research of both sides.
In each of the cases cited by Firemaster, the alleged
attempt of counsel to inflame the passion and prejudice of the
jurors by placing themselves in the injured party's shoes was not
found to be reversible error even though it was stated that such
action could be found to be reversible error.
In fact, the specific argument that was objected to by
Firemaster went to the issue of whether or not there was duress
imposed upon Mr. Holbrook to force him to enter into the contracts.
(Tr. at R. 5477-8).

In the special verdict on that issue (R. 2759,

Question 1) the jury answered No, when asked if Mr. Holbrook was
required to enter into the two franchise purchase contracts under
duress.

Therefore, notwithstanding any alleged violation of the

"golden rule", the jury was not influenced to find for Mr. Holbrook
on the specific point which would have been influenced by the
conduct complained of by Firemaster.

This is but another example

of Firemaster alleging error frivolously.
Firemaster failed to marshall the evidence to show that
the jury results could only be based on passion and prejudice.
Therefore, their appeal fails as a matter of lav/. Price-Orem Dev.
Inc. , supra, and State v. Larsen, supra. The fact that Firemaster
prevailed on the very issue complained of shows the predatory
nature of Firemaster in this case and its actions to bankrupt Mr.
Holbrook with frivolous but expensive legal action. It should show
52

tactics, it is Firemaster.

G. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY REFUSE TO MAKE
PERMANENT THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.
For the reasons set forth above and pursuant to the
Wright, supra and Kinsman, supra cases the Trial Court did not err
in failing to make the preliminary injunction permanent.
the preliminary

injunction

was

clearly

a wrongfully

In fact,
entered

injunction given the jury findings that Mr. Holbrook had fulfilled
his obligations under the contracts between June of 19 87 and July
of 1990 and that Firemaster breached all three agreements.

No

other explanation can exist in the case! (R. 2729-37).
Regarding the Court's decision to require an "equitable"
payment for access to the confidential customer list, Mr. Holbrook
argued that Firemaster was not entitled by its' actions to any form
of equitable relief.

Such arguments were

set forth

in Mr.

Holbrook's memorandum below. (R. 3510-18). The arguments set forth
therein are incorporated by this reference. Mr. Holbrook set forth
below that Firemaster's actions prohibited any Court from extending
to it equitable relief.

See Battistone v. American Land and Dev.

Co., 607 P.2d 837 (Utah 1980) and Bradford v. Alvey and Sons, 621
P.2d

1240

(Utah 1980).

This same reasoning applies to this

appellate issue raised by Firemaster.
If Firemaster is entitled to a permanent injunction given
the facts of this case, Mr. Holbrook respectfully requests this
Court to explain in detail the legal reasoning of how a party that
is found to have tortiously converted the funds of another, having
breached the contracts that provide the basis for injunctive
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breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
regarding the contracts to the other contracting party and having
been found

liable

for punitive damages

for its willful

and

intentional acts can come before a Court of equity in the State of
Utah with "clean hands, *' and therefore be entitled to equitable
relief.
Firemaster is not entitled to a continuation of the
injunction and in fact Mr. Holbrook should have been entitled to
put on evidence, as he requested and as set forth below, of his
damages as a result of the wrongful imposition of the injunction
and should be permitted to have that amount determined and awarded
to him.

VIII.
CROSS-APPEAL ARGUMENTS

A.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT MR.
HOLBROOK'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REQUESTING
FIREMASTER TO BE REQUIRED TO PERFORM AND PAY FOR A FAIR AND
IMPARTIAL ACCOUNTING UNDER THE CONTRACTS.
Since this issue was decided by the Trial Court by way
of motion for summary judgment, it is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness. The reviewing Court need not ascribe any
weight to the findings of the Trial Court,, See Jones v. Bountiful
City,

187 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Pursuant to Sections 8(c), 8(d) and 8(e) of each of the

contracts, Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 entered into
between the parties, all of the proceeds of all sales and service

54

performed

under

Firemaster.

the

contracts

were

specifically

assigned

to

The customers were to remit payment directly to the

Firemaster offices. This language can be reviewed on each invoice
in the accounting Trial Exhibits 101-4182.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 114.)

(See an example at

The specific language on the invoice

used by Firemaster is:
"Seller hereby assigns this Account Receivable to Master
Protection Including All Taxes"
Firemaster was then responsible by contract to receive the money,
perform

accounting

and

bookkeeping

services

relating

to the

account, pursuant to contract as set forth therein, regarding the
funds so received and disburse the appropriate and correct sums to
Mr. Holbrook. Firemaster received in excess of $158,000 for these
services.

Firemaster kept the critical invoices as confidential

documents and would not permit Mr. Holbrook to have them.

H

therefore e could not even perform his own accounting. (Tr. at R.
4401-12, 4595, 4693-95, 4700-1, 4701-3).
In the event that Mr. Holbrook received cash, he was to
turn that cash immediately over to Firemaster so that it could be
accounted for in the same process as payments mailed to the
Firemaster office. (See section 4-8 of Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits
1, 2 and 3.)
As a result of the Firemaster procedure set forth by the
contracts, as drafted by Firemaster, Firemaster was in complete
control of the proceeds of all sales and service, in control of all
critical documentation, and in control of all bookkeeping and
accounting pertaining to receipt of income and the distribution of
such income between the parties.
As set forth in the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
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3

5

Mr. Holbrook requested of the Court that Firemaster be required to
perform and pay for a fair and impartial accounting.
only

response

was

to

argue

its

Firemaster's

interpretation

responsibilities under the contracts (R. 1409-13).

of

its

The clear rule

of contract interpretation is to attempt to construe a contract in
conformance with the intent of the parties, and if that fails to
construe the contract against the drafter.

See Atlas Corp v.

Clovis National Bank 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987); Sears v. Reimersma,
655 P. 2d 1105 (Utah 1982); and Parks Enterprises, Inc. v. New
Century Realty, Inc. 652 P.2d 918 (Utah 1982).
The Trial Court refused to grant Mr. Holbrook's Motion
for an accounting and Mr. Holbrook was required to hire his own
accounting expert to perform an independent accounting of the
monetary affairs between the parties, for which the Trial Court
unbelievably has not required Firemaster to pay.
When the accuracy of the bookkeeping and accounting
services

of

Firemaster

was

called

into

question,

and

when

Firemaster was the party that had actual physical control of the
funds, of all financial paperwork concerning invoicing for, receipt
of, and distribution of income and was specifically paid for such
services by contract, there is no material question of fact but
that Firemaster should have been responsible to perform and pay for
a fair and impartial accounting of the affairs between the parties.
To not order such, was clear reversible error by the Trial Court.
Now that Mr. Holbrook has paid for such accounting, the
practical solution is to find that Firemaster is liable for all
costs relating to Mr. Holbrook's independent accounting in this
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B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING FIREMASTER'S MOTION
TO DISMISS MR. HOLBROOK'S STATE AND FEDERAL RACKETEERING CLAIMS.

Firemaster

filed

repeated

Rule

12(b)(6) motions

to

dismiss the Utah State and Federal Racketeering claims brought by
Mr.

Holbrook.

The

Trial

Court

eventually

dismissed

those

racketeering claims based upon its finding that the contracts
between the parties stated that California law applied (R. 167174, 1675-76.

See also Tr. at R. 5174-91).

The standard for review this Court must look at is one
of reviewing the decision for correctness, since the decision was
one of the Trial Court on a motion to dismiss and the reviewing
Court should not ascribe any particular weight to the findings of
the Trial Court.
The
opportunities
utilized.

See Jones, supra.

Trial

Court

provided

Mr.

Holbrook

several

to amend his complaint, which opportunities he

(R* 667-701, 1298-1399).

It is the position of Mr.

Holbrook that he fully and completely stated a sufficient claim for
purposes of avoiding a motion to dismiss by Firemaster under both
the Utah State racketeering statute and the Federal racketeering
statute. (R. 1332-65).
The basis

of

the

Trial

Court's

decision

was

that

California law applied and that since no claim for relief under a
California racketeering statute was pled, the Utah and Federal
claims should be dismissed. Racketeering claims are basically tort
claims. They are not contract claims. Under the law of tort claims
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"cnere are w e n esrannsnea rules relating to the law of which forum
applies.
A "tort" under Utah law is a legal wrong committed by one
against the person or property of another and is a violation of
duty imposed by law.

Kimiko Toma v. Utah Power & Light Co. 3 65

P.2d 788 (Utah 1959).
Utah law was not found on the issue of whether Utah
follows the general rule regarding

choice of

law provisions

relating to "torts". Other states are clear on this issue.
In the Washington case of Haberman v. Washington Public
Power Supply System, 744 P.2d 1032 (Wash. 1987), the Court there
held that the choice of law in a contract does not govern tort
actions arising out of contracts.

The choice of law in the

contract may be considered as one of the elements in the most
significant relationship test used in tort cases.
This most significant relationship concept is the general
rule which mandates that the first step in choice of law cases is
to have the Court evaluate the contacts with each interested
jurisdiction according to their relative importance to the issue.
The underlying facts of the case is the most important issue. See
Southwell v. Widing Transp., Inc., 676 P.2d 477 (Wash. 1984).
Under each of the significant contracts and underlying
facts in this case, a Utah Court should clearly find that Utah law
applied.

The contracts between the parties were executed in Salt

Lake City.

The operation of the independent

contractor and

franchise areas occurred primarily in the State of Utah.
majority of the witnesses were in the State of Utah.
accounting records were in the State of Utah.

The

All of the

The damage to Mr.

Holbrook occurred in the State of Utah. All funds were handled in
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Utah.

The law of Utah should apply to the racketeering claims of

Mr. Holbrook rather that the law of the State of California.
However, as argued to Judge Brian prior to his ruling
dismissing the racketeering claims, California law would reach the
same conclusion.

In the case of Doyle v. the United States, 530

F.Supp. 1278 (Cent. Dist. of Calif. 1982) a California Court found
the

same

criteria

to be

applicable

as

set

forth

above for

determining which law to apply to tort claims. In the Doyle, supra
case, the California Court found that Louisiana law applied based
upon the application of the same criteria regarding the significant
relationships to the case.

If those same criteria are applied in

the extant case, even under California law, the racketeering law
of the State of Utah would be applied

rather than that of

California.
The existence of a Federal racketeering claim being
dismissed on the basis that California Law applied makes absolutely
no

sense

under

any

applicable

rule of

law.

In fact, the

jurisdictional requirements of the Federal racketeering statute
mandate that elements of the action must have occurred across state
boundaries in order to qualify as a Federal racketeering cause of
action. (R. 1356-65).

Such cause of action therefore pre-supposes

that multiple states will be involved and Federal law will apply.
To permit the language of a contract to be the sole
grounds to dictate the choice of law relating to tortious or
racketeering

actions

between

those

parties

is

very

simply

reversible error.
Mr. Holbrook therefore respectfully requests this Court
to vacate the order dismissing Plaintiff's

Utah and Federal

racketeering causes of action and to vacate the award to Firemaster
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action.

icca abbuuicitea wiin "cne aismissai or tne uran cause
(R.

3883,

Paragraph

3).

Mr.

Holbrook

further

respectfully requests that the State and Federal racketeering
claims be remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings on
the grounds that such claims have been pled sufficiently to defeat
a motion to dismiss.

C.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE
PLAINTIFF TO PUT ON EVIDENCE AT TRIAL OF LOST PROFITS INCURRED AS
A RESULT OF THE WRONGFUL IMPOSITION OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND/OR ALTERNATIVELY TO PERMIT SUCH A DETERMINATION AS PART OF MR.
HOLBROOK7S POST-TRIAL MOTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF.
Both of the decisions appealed from here were decisions
of the Court which therefore are viewed under the "correctness"
standard set forth in the Jones, supra case.
The Court made its ruling to refuse Mr. Holbrook the
right to put on evidence of lost profits based upon a motion in
limine of Firemaster filed on the Friday before the Monday trial
beginning.

(R. 3034-45, 2887-3033).

Mr. Holbrook's counsel,

pointed out to the Court that at page 139 of his Second Amended
Complaint (Tr. at R. 4481-85), he specifically requested damages
for the wrongful imposition of the injunction. It is true that Mr.
Holbrook did not say the two words that the Court and Firemaster
believe to be "magic", those two words being lost profits. He did
specifically request damages for the wrongful imposition of the
injunction.
It is true that Rule 9(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
requires that a claim for lost profits must be alleged with
specificity. However, Firemaster is clearly on notice of the plain
language of the complaint.

The controlling case on this issue is
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the Utah case of Cohen v. J.C. Penney Co.,

537 P. 2d 306, (Utah

1975) where the Court indicated that a failure to state the words
"lost profits1' is not death to the ability of a Plaintiff to
introduce such evidence, if the lost profits automatically flow
from the injury complained of.
In this case it is obvious that if Firemaster requested
an injunction restraining Mr. Holbrook from performing services
pursuant to that injunction and was required to post a $75,000 bond
as they did, the fact that Mr. Holbrook would lose income from the
failure to work would automatically follow.

If the injunction was

not wrongful, no damage exists to Mr. Holbrook. If the preliminary
injunction was wrongful, Mr. Holbrook should be entitled to put on
damages of the clearly consequential lost profits.
The only purpose for Firemaster to post a $75,000.00
injunction bond, was to guarantee such damages, if the injunction
was wrongful.

For Firemaster to thereafter argue it had no

knowledge or notice that Mr. Holbrook would seek damages for lost
profits as a result of such injunction is ludicrous.

It is only

too obvious that a party has notice of its own actions and
consequently the ability to prepare regarding defending those
actions.

The Court clearly erred in refusing to permit evidence

of the lost profits at trial or deciding the issue correctly
thereafter.
Mr. Holbrook brought the matter to the Trial Court's
attention by way of his motion for declaratory relief after trial
(R. 3194-95, 3196-3194, 3195-3350, 3351-53). The Court refused to
grant

damages

to Mr. Holbrook

as a result his

request

for

declaratory relief for what apparently was the Court's finding that
the injunction was not wrongfully
61

entered. (Tr. at R. 4808-13,

4b^b, 4b44-4b). The ]ury verdicts finding that Firemaster breached
all three of the contracts of the parties causes a tremendous
conflict with the concept found by the Trial Court that the
injunction was not wrongfully entered and is unexplained by the
Trial Court either by findings of fact or law.
The sole basis for the injunction in the first instance
was

Firemaster's

alleged

contractual

right

to

have

such

an

injunction, assuming that Firemaster had not breached the contracts
and that Mr. Holbrook had further obligations under the contracts
after January of 1990.
1990.

The injunction was entered in March of

The clear independent findings of the jury and Trial Court

were that Firemaster had breached all three of the agreements, that
Mr. Holbrook had no further obligations under the contracts and
there

is no other

explanation

injunction was wrongfully

that

entered.

follows

except

that the

The Court does not have

authority to reform the parties agreements. Cunningham, supra.
In order to have any consistency

and logic in the

application of contractual rules and obligations, this Court must
find that the breach of all three agreements and termination of
Mr.Holbrook's obligations under those contracts mandates that the
injunction was wrongfully entered and appropriate damages therefore
must flow to the Plaintiff.
Mr. Holbrook and all parties who have had their contracts
breached by the other party, are entitled to a similar clear
statement as set forth in the Kinsman and Wright, supra cases of
this Court that a breaching party is by law not entitled to require
performance of the nonbreaching party to the contracts.

Without

such a finding by this Court, all parties to contracts in the State
of Utah will be totally at a loss as to how they should perform
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once the other side to the contract has indicated their disdain for
the written agreement by breaching such agreement.
Mr. Holbrook submitted in his motion for directed verdict
a request for $75,000.00 of damages for the wrongful imposition of
the injunction.

The Court had sufficient evidence before it to

find that $75,000.00 would be an appropriate award of damages. (R.
at 3146-94, 3195-3350).

The Trial Court set that number as the

bond amount based upon the representation by Firemaster that the
$75,000 figure was approximately the amount of profit Mr. Holbrook
had earned in his last full year with Firemaster while operating
the independent contractor and franchise areas. (Tr. at R. 5139).
The Trial Court should have awarded the entire $75,000.00 to Mr.
Holbrook as a result of the wrongful imposition of the injunction
and had substantial evidence to permit it to do so.
This $75,000 figure was the amount the Court stated off
the record it would order as a bond.
at least $500,000.

Mr. Holbrook has asked for

Firemaster suggested the $75,000 figure based

upon the amount it represented was Mr. Holbrook's net income for
1989.
Mr. Holbrook therefore respectfully requests this Court
to find as error the Trial Court's refusal to permit him to put on
evidence of damage at trial as a result of the wrongful imposition
of the injunction, to ascribe as error the decision of the Trial
Court regarding the Plaintiff's motion for declaratory relief not
to permit him to put on further evidence of damage and/or to find
that the Plaintiff was damaged in the amount of $75,000.00 for the
wrongful imposition of the injunction.
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR WHERE THE DISTRICT COURT
REFUSED TO PERMIT EVIDENCE OF FIREMASTER'S NET WORTH TO GO TO THE
JURY.
Mr. Holbrook sought to admit the financial statement of
Firemaster into evidence towards the close of his case. (Tr. at R.
5442).

Firemaster's counsel objected to the introduction of this

evidence and the Court sustained this objection indicating that if
it was going to be introduced, it would be after some later ruling
by the Court.
The special verdict relating to conversion by Firemaster
requesting punitive damages was permitted by the parties and the
Court to go to the jury and the jury returned an award of punitive
damages without having reviewed any financial information concerning Firemaster. (R. 2743-45).
The cases of this Court are clear that it essential for
the trier of fact to know the financial condition of a party
against whom punitive damages are to be assessed for a correct
determination of the amount of punitive damages. See Crookston v.
Fire Insurance Exchange, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1991).
In post-trial motions, Firemaster interestingly raised
this issue and it came for hearing before the Trial Court. In that
hearing,

(Tr. at R. 5795-5803), the Court indicated that it

believed that the matter was not handled correctly.

The Trial

Court indicated that the Court, Plaintiff's Counsel and Defense
Counsel all had a hand in causing the problem to not be handled
correctly and that the matter should be resolved by way of a new
trial on the correct amount of punitive damages.

When the Court

made such statements, counsel for Firemaster withdrew the motion.
It is clear that the amount of punitive damages was not
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correctly assessed pursuant to the criteria set forth under Utah
law.

See Crookston, supra.

Since the issue was submitted

incorrectly, the issue should be remanded for a new jury or a
Court's determination of the correct amount of punitive damages.
This is the procedure mandated under the Utah case of Bundy v.
Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984).

E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING MR. HOLBROOK'S
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, JUDGMENT NOV, AND/OR MOTION FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF, STRIKING THE JURY VERDICT TO FIREMASTER FOR
BREACH OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT.
The

Trial

Court

erred

in

refusing

Plaintiff's Motion for a Directed Verdict,

to

grant

the

for Judgment Notwith-

standing the Verdict and Declaratory Relief.

Mr. Holbrook proved

that Firemaster breached all the agreements during the applicable
time periods of June 1987 through January 1990, and that all
breaches alleged against Mr. Holbrook occurred after he terminated
his relationship with Firemaster, and after enduring two and onehalf years of accounting abuses by Firemaster. Firemaster did not
even put on any evidence that Mr. Holbrook had failed in any of his
obligations under the contracts (Tr. at R. 5244-45)
This is a mixed question of law and fact.

The factual

composition of the Directed Verdict Motion, Judgment NOV, and
Declaratory Relief claims are reviewable under a clearly erroneous
standard.

See the case of Matter of Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d

885 (Utah 1989).

The legal propriety of the district Court's

decision

issue

on this

and the resulting

legal

reviewable under correction of errors standard.

effects are

Jones, supra.

The cases decided by this Court of Wright and Kinsman,
supra clearly establish that once a contract is breached by one
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obligations under the contract.
The

only

way

to

bring

sanity

and

consistency

to

contractual relations, when breaches occur, is to conform to the
rules set forth by this Court in the Wright and Kinsman, supra
cases set forth above.
Based upon Utah law and the facts as clearly found by the
jury, and recognized independently by the Trial Court in this case,
this Court as a matter of law must strike any awards to Firemaster
flowing from obligations Mr. Holbrook would have had under the
contracts but for Firemaster's breaches of the contracts between
June of 1987 and January of 1990.

This means that the Court must

strike the jury verdict award of $10,000 to Firemaster, must
sustain the Trial Court's decision not to impose liability on the
notes, must find that Mr. Holbrook was therefore the "prevailing
party" in the action for purposes of assessing attorneys' fees and
costs, must find that Mr. Holbrook receive damages for the wrongful
injunction, and must

reverse the decision of the Trial Court

charging Mr. Holbrook $11,014.00 in cash as an "equitable" payment
in order for him to have access to the confidential customer list.

F.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD MR.
HOLBROOK HIS COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AS THE PREVAILING PARTY IN
THIS ACTION AND UNDER THE STANDARDS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION
78-27-56.
The standard for review in this matter is that for a
mixed question of law and fact.

The factual composition of the

district Court's ruling is reviewable under a clearly erroneous
standard.

Matter of Estate of Bartell, supra.

The legal issues

of awarding attorney's fees and costs is reviewable under a
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correction of error standard.

Jones, supra.

Once the Court makes the decision to terminate any
further

obligations

of

Mr.

Holbrook

after

the

breaches

of

Firemaster ending in January 1990, when Mr. Holbrook terminated
with Firemaster, the refusal to grant Firemaster any further relief
under the contracts dictates that Mr. Holbrook was the "prevailing
party" of this action. Wright , supra. The contracts dictate this
result.
As set forth in each contract, Plaintiff's Exhibits 1,
2 and 3, Firemaster wrote in it would be reimbursed all its costs
and attorneys fees if it was forced to enforce any breaches of the
agreements.

Both Utah and California law make this obligation

mutual. (R. 3195-3350).
above.

See Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56.5 cited

See also West's Annotated California Civil Code Section

1717, Attachment A hereto.
Based on the contracts and the above referenced statutes,
Mr. Holbrook is entitled to his costs and attorneys fees for having
to enforce the contracts against Firemaster. Mr. Holbrook honored
all his contracts for two and one-half years. Only after he could
endure Firemaster's abuses no longer did he cease to honor the
contracts.
rewarded by

Such honor by Mr. Holbrook should be recognized and
this

Court.

Conversely, the

lack of honor by

Firemaster should be penalized by an award of costs and attorneys'
fees to Mr. Holbrook.
This decision is also true for purposes of assessing
costs and attorney's fees under the Mountain States Broadcasting
v. Neale, supra case which sets forth the "net" winner standard.
Not only was Mr. Holbrook the "net" winner as described
in the Mountain States, supra case but under the standard set forth
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in Utah Code Annotated Section 7 8-27-5 6, the Trial Court abused its
discretion in failing to award attorneys' fees to Mr. Holbrook
where Firemaster was found to have tortiously converted his funds
to have breached its fiduciary duty to Mr. Holbrook, to have
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to Mr.
Holbrook and punitive damages were awarded against Firemaster.
Code Section States in pertincut as follows:

(1) "In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
dtermines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit andnot brought or asserted in good
faith..."

If a Plaintiff can convince a jury of all of the relief
awarded to Mr. Holbrook in this action for the opposing party's
tortious and bad faith conduct, including an award of punitive
damages, he clearly has met the standard of Utah Code Annotated 7827-56 sufficient to permit the Court to award attorneys' fees and
costs.

If that statute has any meaning in the law of Utah, it was

clear error not to apply it in this instance as requested by Mr.
Holbrook and the failure to do so was a clear abuse of the Court's
discretion.
Additionally, the Court should consider the logistics
problem facing Mr. Holbrook in bringing this action. He had to pay
an attorney. He had to hire an accountant to dig through thousands
of documents (Trial Exhibits 101-4182) that he had. already paid
Firemaster $158,000 to track and account for.
Firemaster is a large, multi-million dollar nationwide
company.

Mr. Holbrook is an individual Utah resident who earned

a decent living but is not wealthy.
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For an individual such as Mr.

Holbrook to take on a nationwide company is an incredible effort.
To prevail as Mr. Holbrook did and to show the bad faith and
predatory

action

of

Firemaster

as

it

did

clearly

shows

an

entitlement to costs and attorneys' fees.
Through no other process, except the award of costs,
attorneys fees and punitive damages, can predatory companies such
as Firemaster be stopped from doing to their contracting parties
such as Mr. Holbrook what a jury unanimously found they did to Mr.
Holbrook.
Mr. Holbrook respectfully requests this Court to order
that which Mr. Holbrook was entitled to his costs and attorneys'
fees and to remand the issue of the amount to the Trial Court.

G. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING MR. HOLBROOK
TO PAY $11,014.00 IN CASH AS AN "EQUITABLE" PAYMENT TO FIREMASTER
FOR ACCESS TO THE CONFIDENTIAL CUSTOMER LIST WHERE MR. HOLBROOK WAS
FOUND TO HAVE FULLY PERFORMED HIS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONTRACTS
This issue presents a mixed question of law and fact.
As set forth above, the factual composition of the issue is
reviewable under a clearly erroneous standard.
Estate of Bartell, supra.
equity

See matter of

The propriety of the application of

sua sponte by the Trial Court to award Firemaster an

"equitable" sum is reviewable under a correction of error standard.
Jones, supra.
The Trial Court saw and heard the evidence at trial, and
made a decision declaring that Mr. Holbrook

had

no further

obligations under his contracts except this "equitable payment"
(Tr. at R. 4808-13, 4844-46).
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The Trial Court clearly was

entitled to any further relief under the contracts between the
parties.(Tr. at R. 4844-46).

Neither party requested equitable

relief as imposed by the Court.

The Court came up with the

solution on its own.
While the parties argued the Court's suggestion, Mr.
Holbrook consistently maintained that Firemaster, because of its
tortious conduct as found by the jury was not entitled to relief
from a Court of equity.

(R.3712-17).

See Battistone v. American

Land and Dev. Co., 607 P.2d 837 (Utah 1980); Bradford v. Alvey and
Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980).

The case of Cunningham, supra at

Page 553 indicates that the Trial Court should not revise the
parties agreement by the use of equity.
Court

have

detailed

contracts

which

These parties before the
should

dictate

their

relationships as decided by the law of contracts.
The Trial Court made no findings to identify any legal
standard it relied upon to justify awarding equitable relief to
Firemaster. (R. 3728-29). As such, it is difficult to specifically
criticize the decision of the Trial Court.

It is clear from the

cases cited by Mr. Holbrook in his argument before the Trial Court
that one coming into equity must do equity, must have clean hands
or they would be barred from obtaining equitable relief.

See

Battistone, supra and Bradford, supra. Although Firemaster did not
request the relief the Court awarded, it was the beneficiary of
such relief.
A party found to have breached contracts repeatedly, in
hundreds of instances over a two and one-half year period, in a
manner justifying the imposition of punitive damages precludes such
party from requesting or receiving equitable relief from a Court,
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or as in this case, from a Court Sua Sponte, without clear findings
of fact or citation to law to support such a decision.
The decision of the Trial Court to award Firemaster
equitable relief was clearly erroneous and a clear abuse of its
discretion. Therefore, such award to Firemaster should be vacated
by this Court.

IX.
CONCLUSION

This matter was tried to a jury for six days.

Mr.

Holbrook was required to pay an accountant to do over that which
he

had

paid

Firemaster

over

bookkeeping and accounting

$158,000.00

services

to

perform,

i.e.

relating to the accounts

serviced during the parties relationship.

In that performance,

Mr. Holbrook proved to the satisfaction of the jury that he had
been damaged in the amount of $91,807. by the various breaches of
contract and tortious activity of Firemaster.

The amount awarded

was less than one-half of the damage amounts testified to by Mr.
Holbrook and his expert.
All of the damage done by Firemaster to Mr. Holbrook
occurred during the time period of June of 1987 and January of
1990.
The only claims Firemaster has against Mr. Holbrook are
based upon actions of Mr. Holbrook from going into competition with
Firemaster after January of 1990, after he had terminated his
relationship

with

Firemaster

because

of

Firemaster's

prior

repeated, egregious actions.
Firemaster's appellate issues are all meritless because
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and because of its waiver of the alleged errors by its own
stipulations at trial.
Firemaster failed to marshall any evidence to convince
this Court of the correctness or soundness of its arguments, but
instead chose solely to marshall certain evidence in its favor, a
clear deviation from proper appellate procedure that should doom
its appeals.
A jury found unanimously for the Plaintiff on the wrongs
set forth in the special verdicts.

Independent of the jury, the

Trial Court similarly found that Mr. Holbrook had no further
obligations

under

the

contracts

with

the

exception

of

the

$11,014.00 award, which was not an award under the contracts but
a sua sponte award by the Trial Court.
The 4,000 plus accounting exhibits which are the core of
the wrongs in this case were completely reviewed only by Mr.
Holbrook and Mr. Miller, his accountant.

The problems pertaining

to such exhibits as testified to at trial, and the intentional
abuses of Mr. Holbrook's rights as testified to and recognized by
the jury clearly provided substantial evidence for the jury's
verdict.

No one from Firemaster ever testified to show that the

problems identified by Mr. Holbrook and Mr. Miller were incorrect.
To go against the weight of what was testified about concerning
those Exhibits is what a Court must do to set aside the jury's
awards.

The jury did not.

Independent of the jury, Judge Brian

did not.
This Court has already decided thoughtful and appropriate
precedent with its findings in the Wright, and Kinsman, supra
cases.

Mr. Holbrook was and should be lawfully excused from any
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further performance under the contracts as a result of Firemaster's
breaches. Mr. Holbrook should be totally excused from any and all
performance including the striking of the Firemaster award of
$10,000 for alleged breaches of the confidentiality provisions of
the contracts, as a result of Firemaster's prior repeated breaches
over two and one-half years. Mr. Holbrook honored his contracts.
Firemaster did not.

Such honor should be rewarded.

The result of the threshold legal decision being made
to strike the $10,000 award to Firemaster entitles Mr. Holbrook to
his costs, attorneys' fees, a finding that the injunction in the
case was wrongful, an award of damages to him from such wrongful
injunction

and

a striking

of the

$11,014

"equitable" award.

Additionally, the erroneous legal decisions of the Trial Court as
argued in this brief relating to punitive damages, to dismissing
Mr. Holbrook's Utah State and Federal Racketeering claims and the
Court's refusal to permit Mr. Holbrook to put on evidence of his
lost profits as a result of the injunction were prejudicial errors
which should be resolved by a reversal of the decisions and a
remand of those matters for further proceedings before the Trial
Court.
DATED this

ay o£

^U)+f^~\A^l^

, 1992.

RICHARD N. BIGELOW
Attorney for Plaintij
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ATTACHMENT A

the action. The eoun may allow me ruing 01 a pieaaing claiming naDuity naseo upon a a m
conspiracy following the filing of a verified petition therefor accompanied by the propoeed pleading
and tupporting affidavits ttating the facta upon which the liability it bated. The court thill order
service of the petition upon the party against whom the action it propoeed to be filed and permit that
party to tubmit opposing affidavit* prior to making its determination. Hie filing of the petition,
propoeed pleading and accompanying affidavits shall toll the running of any applicable statute of
limitations until the final determination of the matter, which ruling, if favorable to the petitioning
party, thall permit the propoeed pleading to be filed.
(Added by Stata.1988, c. 1052, } 1.)
Historical aad Statatery Nairn
1 M iffUUytoa

"It it ihe intent of the UfUUture in enactinf thit neisure to modify the decision of the Court of Appeal in
Wolfrich Corp. v. United Service* Automobile Asm, 149
Cal.App Jd 1206 (1st Diat 1913)."

Section 2 of S t a t a W t , c 1052, provides:

| 1717. Action on contract; award of attorney's feet and costs; prefailing party; deposit of
amounts In insured, interest-bearing account; damages not baaed on contract
(a) In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and
costs, which are incurred to enforce * * * that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties
or to the prevailing party, then the party who it determined to be the party prevailing on the
contract, whether he or ahe it the party specified in the contract or not, thall be entifleTto
reasonable attorney's feet in addition to other coata * * •
Where a contract provides for attorney's feet, at aet forth above, that provision thall be construed
at applying to the entire contract, unless each party was representeTBy counsel in the negotiation
and execution of the contract, and the fact of that representation it specified in the contract
Reasonable attorney's fees thall be fixed by the court, • * * and thall be an element of the coats
of tuit
Attorney't feet provided for by thit section shall not be subject to waiver by the parties to any
contract which it entered into after the effective date of thit section. Any provision in any tuch
contract which providea for a waiver of attorney's feet it void.
(bXl) The court, upon notice and motion by a party, thai! determine who k thc^arty prevailing on
the contract for purposes of thit section, whether or not the tuit proceeds to final judgment Except
an provided in paragraph (2), the party prevailing on the coo tract thai! be the party who recovered a
greater relief in the action on the contract The court may alto determine that there is no party
prevailing on the contract for purpoaea of thit section!
(2) Where an action has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the
esse, there thai! be no prevailing party for purpoaea of thit section.
Where the defendant alleges in hit or her answer that be or the tendered to the plaintiff the full
amount to which he or the was entitled, and thereupon deposits in court for the plaintiff, the amount
to tendered, and the allegation it found to be true, then the defendant it deemed to be a party
prevailing on the contract within the meaning of this sectionWhere a depotit baa been made pursuant to thit section, the court shall, on the application of any
party to the action, order the deposit to be invested in an insured, interest-bearing account Interest
on the amount shall be allocated to the parties in the same proportion as the original funds are
allocated.
(c) In an action which seeks relief in addition to that based on a contract, if the party prevailing on
the contract has damages awarded against it oiTcauses of action not on the contract, the amounts
awarded to the party prevailing on the contract under this section shall be deducted from any
3amagea awarded in favor of the party who did not Prevail on the contract If the amount awarded
under'this section exceeds the amount of flamages awarded the party not prevailing on the contract
the net amount shall be awarded the party prevailing on the contract and judgment may be entered
5 favor of the party prevailing on the contract for that net amount
(Amended by Stata.1986, c, ST?, | 1; Stata.1986, c 785, f 1; Stats. 1*87, c 1080, f 1.)
Hletorkal aad Sutmtory NaSaa
tm LegteUtSoa
The 1986 ameadmeat hjr c 7S5 added the bat ptrynph
whkh provided that the court should order depoait of the

amount tendered b aa bitereat beahnf account upoc appbemtio* of any party.

Additions or change* Indlcatad by undartnt; delations by aateriaka • • •
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